The Class is Greener on the Other Side: How Private Donations to Public Schools Play into Fair Funding by Abigail Margaret Frisch
FRISCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2017 10:11 PM 
 
THE CLASS IS GREENER ON THE OTHER 
SIDE: HOW PRIVATE DONATIONS TO PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS PLAY INTO FAIR FUNDING 
ABIGAIL MARGARET FRISCH† 
ABSTRACT 
  It has been observed that forays into public education finance 
resemble Russian novels—“long, tedious, and everybody dies in the 
end.” On any given day, dozens of news stories describe schools 
nationwide struggling to make ends meet. And, just as “each unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way,” each underfunded school is 
underfunded in its own complicated way. Funding for public education 
comes from many places, chief among them local property taxes, at 
least historically. States—which bear primary responsibility for 
administering their education systems—and private litigants have 
struggled for over sixty years to produce funding formulas that weaken 
the link between a community’s wealth, as measured by property taxes, 
and the quality of its education.  
  Alongside that trend to develop more equitable public funding, 
another trend began to emerge, in the form of increased public school 
reliance on sophisticated private fundraising organizations. Studies 
show that these organizations are unequally distributed along 
socioeconomic lines, leading many to conclude that they foster exactly 
the sort of inequitable public school resources that states have been 
trying to stifle. Although there is not enough data to claim that this 
disrupts equitable funding efforts statewide or nationwide, these 
organizations continue to grow rapidly, and the existing anecdotal 
evidence of neighboring schools with dramatically different resources 
is troubling. Calls to prohibit such private donations are also troubling, 
however, as these donations are well intended and provide schools with 
necessary resources and community support.  
  Currently, no state-level regulations exist to provide guidance for 
how private donations might equitably exist within a publicly funded 
 
Copyright © 2017 Abigail Margaret Frisch. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2018. I am grateful to Professor Margaret 
H. Lemos for her guidance toward and within this topic, to Professor Jeremy Mullem and the 
Scholarly Writing Workshop for their input on early drafts, to the editors of the Duke Law 
Journal for their hard work, and to my in-famous family for their humor and encouragement.  
FRISCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2017  10:11 PM 
428  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:427 
school system. This Note argues that it is time for state legislators to 
break this silence and proactively determine a statewide protocol for 
private donations that comports with their state’s mission to provide a 
high quality public education to children from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds. In doing so, this Note emphasizes that it is critical to 
avoid characterizing private donations as inherently good or inherently 
bad because solutions permitting unlimited private donations are as 
undesirable as solutions that completely eliminate them. State 
legislators are equipped to find an appropriate point on that spectrum, 
one which protects the valuable goal of providing public education to 
all children equitably but does not discourage the valuable benefits of 
local community support for public education. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been observed that forays into public education finance 
resemble Russian novels—“long, tedious, and everybody dies in the 
end.”1 On any given day, dozens of news stories describe schools 
nationwide struggling to make ends meet.2 And, just as “each unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way,”3 the funding scheme for each school 
is complicated in its own way. The United States has more than 14,000 
school districts,4 containing roughly 98,000 schools,5 and each school 
receives a unique combination of federal, state, and local public 
funding, alongside funds it raises on its own.6 As Chief Justice Earl 
 
 1. Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991). The same idea has also been stated somewhat less elegantly. See David 
Anderson, Parents Urge Harford School Officials To Reduce Class Sizes, Pay Teachers, BALT. 
SUN: AEGIS (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/harford/aegis/ph-ag-
school-budget-workshop-1019-20161014-story.html [https://perma.cc/VA8E-RV64] (“It creates 
an excessive amount of public drama and outcry and is an absolute sucking black hole of wasted 
time, energy and resources on everyone’s part.”). 
 2. An online news alert set to “(school OR education) AND (fund OR finance)” in fall 
2016 generated roughly thirty articles per week. For an example of one of these articles, see Bryan 
Lowry, School Finance Case Poses Potential Fiscal Crisis for Kansas, WICHITA EAGLE (Sept. 17, 
2016), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article102495432.html [https://perma.cc/
LM8Z-9CSF].  
 3. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Wordsworth Eds. Ltd. 1995) (1877). 
 4. School Districts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 15, 2012), https://www.census.gov/did/
www/schooldistricts [https://perma.cc/HYK6-WF6H].  
 5. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 216.10. Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 
by Level of School: Selected Years, 1967–68 Through 2014–15, DIG. EDUC. STAT. (Oct. 2016), 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_216.10.asp?current=yes [https://perma.cc/
32HS-9GN7].  
 6. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 235.20. Revenues for Public Elementary and 
Secondary Schools, by Source of Funds and State or Jurisdiction: 2013–14, DIG. EDUC. STAT. (July 
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Warren observed in 1954, “education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments,” as well as “the very 
foundation of good citizenship,” such that “it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.”7 The economic resources dedicated to 
education are as significant as its societal importance—government 
revenue dedicated to public elementary and secondary schools was 
$623 billion in 2013–14.8  
Due in part to primary education’s “highly localized,” one-room-
schoolhouse roots, and later affirmed by provisions in state 
constitutions, the ultimate legal responsibility for maintenance of 
public education systems is traditionally on state governments.9 States 
dedicate around 20 percent of their total budgets to education.10 But as 
shown below in Figure 1, schools receive roughly half of their funding 
from local sources,11 and the federal government is also a significant 
financial contributor.12 This makes for a plethora of unwieldly public 
school finance equations13 as well as “a lack of accountability,”14 
culminating in a convoluted division of responsibility for schools’ 
underfunding.15  
 
2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_235.20.asp?current=yes [https://
perma.cc/6LHX-CNVC] [hereinafter Table 235.20].  
 7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 8. Table 235.20, supra note 6. 
 9. Claudia Goldin, A Brief History of Education in the United States 3–4, 22 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Historical Paper No. 119, 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/h0119.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/86ZB-DJLB]; see, e.g., Wilmore v. Annear, 65 P.2d 1433, 1437 (Colo. 1937) (“It 
is clear . . . that in so far as the public school fund is concerned the maintenance of public schools 
is a state rather than a local function.”). For a discussion of the explicit language in state 
constitutions describing the state’s responsibility regarding public education, see infra notes 58–
62 and accompanying text.  
 10. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 806 (5th ed. 2012).  
 11. Id. 
 12. Nora E. Gordon, The Changing Federal Role in Education Finance and Governance, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 317, 325 (Helen F. Ladd & 
Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015).  
 13. This is particularly clear in North Carolina. An expert education research firm “met its 
match” when the state retained it to study its funding formulas. Matt Ellinwood, North Carolina’s 
Illogical Neglect of Special Education, NC POL’Y WATCH (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2012/04/13/north-carolinas-illogical-neglect-of-special-education/ 
[https://perma.cc/B2VM-65GH]. It could not “even tell how many different formulas and pots of 
money are involved.” Id. 
 14. Rachel R. Ostrander, School Funding: Inequality in District Funding and the Disparate 
Impact on Urban and Migrant School Children, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 271, 274 (2015).  
 15. Several additional factors contribute to this blame game. It is difficult to hold schools 
accountable for spending, in part because schools are prone to last-minute, one-off items of 
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Figure 1. Sources of Funding for Public Education (2012–13) 
As demonstrated above in Figure 1, property taxes levied by local 
governments comprise the vast majority of local funding.16 Of 
particular interest here, though—about $12 billion in local funding was 
from private sources, including “revenues from gifts, and tuition and 
fees from patrons.”17 The increase in private sources of funding may 
not surprise parents with school-age children, as back-to-school 
shopping lists have crept beyond traditional pencils and rulers because 
of school funding cuts, and now hand sanitizer and facial tissue are 
typical on such lists.18 But, Kleenex boxes are only the beginning of 
 
income and expense. This makes it difficult to track finances in the first place, and to communicate 
with the district and the state about those finances. Making matters worse, if a school does not 
trust the district, the school may have incentive to be less forthcoming about receiving extra 
spending money, fearing the district will supply less public funding next year. See Faith E. 
Crampton & Paul Bauman, Educational Entrepreneurship: A New Challenge to Fiscal Equity?, 28 
EDUC. CONSIDERATIONS 53, 58 (2000) (“[T]he school principals interviewed acknowledged that 
they did not report all entrepreneurial revenues to the central office because, in part, they 
believed they were not required to do so but also because they feared that if the central office 
knew of the revenues they would be taken from the school.”); RON ZIMMER ET AL., PRIVATE 
GIVING TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: A PILOT STUDY 40 
(2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1429.html [https://perma.cc/XDY5-
26EX] (“However, the schools in general were not well informed about district activities. . . . 
[O]nly four of the ten schools in [the] sample cited any district role in their fund-raising efforts, 
suggesting a lack of communication between some districts and schools.”).  
 16. Property taxes make up 81 percent of local funds, accounting for 36 percent of total 
funding. Table 235.20, supra note 6.  
 17. This is about 4 percent of local revenues. Id. The remaining local revenues come from 
other uncategorized sources. Id.  
 18. See, e.g., NEOSHO SCH. DIST., MASTER SCHOOL SUPPLY LIST (2016), https://www
.neoshosd.org/cms/lib/MO01909813/Centricity/Domain/666/MasterSchoolSupplyList-17-18.pdf 
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many communities’ efforts to roll up their sleeves and take 
responsibility for offsetting trims to the public education budget.  
For example, nearly twenty years ago, parents at New York City’s 
P.S. 41 in Greenwich Village collected $46,000 to prevent budget cuts 
from eliminating a fourth grade teacher.19 Rudy Crew, the chancellor 
of New York City’s Department of Education, refused to accept the 
donation, reportedly fearing that “affluent parents might create a two-
tier system, paying for services that poorer schools could not afford.”20 
Across town on the Upper East Side, P.S. 6 principal Carmen Fariña21 
explained that she felt differently about such donations because her 
school received less public money per student than other schools and 
because she directed the funds toward school supplies, computers, and 
part-time extracurricular instructors, which benefitted the whole 
school rather than one class or grade.22 Thinking similarly, the parents 
at P.S. 41 probably anticipated their efforts being met with gratitude 
and relief—after all, how could supporting education be a bad thing?  
As it turns out, any attempt to answer that question generates 
controversy. For the last half-century, states have been engaged in an 
uphill battle to “weaken the link between local property wealth and 
school spending.”23 Starting in the 1960s, litigants troubled by that 
correlation began to challenge the legality of public education finance 
 
[https://perma.cc/9UBX-FDLL] (listing tissues, baby wipes, and sandwich- and snack-size zipper 
storage bags).  
 19. Anemona Hartocollis, Crew Rejects Parents’ Money To Pay One Teacher’s Salary, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/23/nyregion/crew-rejects-parents-
money-to-pay-one-teacher-s-salary.html [https://perma.cc/LC7Y-GCDU]. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Carmen Fariña eventually became the chancellor of the New York City Department of 
Education. Alexander Nazaryan, Carmen Fariña, New York City’s School Chief, and the Perils of 
School Reform, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 10, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/
08/19/charters-schools-nyc-488880.html [https://perma.cc/8RGJ-7R58]. 
 22. Henry Goldman, Parents’ Gift to a N.Y. Public School Raises Issues of Fairness: They 
Contributed $46,000 to Keep a Teacher from Being Transferred. Then the Chancellor Stepped in., 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 26, 1997, at A03. Fariña was referring to “programs that give public 
money to struggling schools with low test scores.” Id. And others contemporaneously commented 
that “[m]ore affluent schools are at a financial disadvantage compared with schools that do not 
qualify for Federal money for poor and disadvantaged students,” asserting that “P.S. 41 received 
18 percent, $700, less per student for classroom instruction than the average elementary school in 
New York City.” Hartocollis, supra note 19.  
 23. Therese J. McGuire, Leslie E. Papke & Andrew Reschovsky, Local Funding of Schools: 
The Property Tax and Its Alternatives, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE 
AND POLICY, supra note 12, at 376, 380.  
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schemes,24 and as of 2014, forty-five states have faced such legal 
challenges.25 Achievement and funding gaps correlating with 
socioeconomic status persist,26 and litigants continue to bring suits 
against state funding systems. Judges in these lawsuits usually order a 
restructuring of the state’s education spending formula, which 
generally appears to result in more spending on education and a more 
equal distribution of that spending, although inconsistent data-
gathering methodology makes it difficult to generalize.27 For some 
states, however, efforts to equalize funding have backfired and resulted 
in a “leveling down” of expenditures.28 The most notable example is 
California, which ranked fifth in the nation for education expenditures 
per pupil in the 1980s but, following equalizing efforts and an economic 
recession, California’s spending had fallen to forty-second by 1995.29 
 
 24. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (“[G]rowing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts were responsible in part for increasingly 
notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.”).  
 25. Sean P. Corcoran & William N. Evans, Equity, Adequacy, and the Evolving State Role in 
Education Finance, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY, supra 
note 12, at 353, 355, 367. 
 26. NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO MANY 
STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 4 (2015). 
 27. Corcoran & Evans, supra note 25, at 367 (“[S]tates affected by court-mandated finance 
reforms have increased expenditures and reduced interdistrict disparities. . . .”). Additionally, 
some state legislatures initiated reform without a court order. McGuire, supra note 23, at 380. But 
see Christopher Berry, The Impact of School Finance Judgments on State Fiscal Policy, in SCHOOL 
MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 213, 233 (Martin R. West 
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (finding “substantively small and statistically insignificant effects 
of school finance judgments,” notwithstanding general findings of “an increase in the state’s share 
of education funding and a modest (perhaps 16 percent) decline in spending inequality related to 
school finance judgments”).  
 28. “Leveling down” is defined as “a reduction in spending disparities accomplished by 
reducing spending at the top of the distribution, either absolutely or relative to what it would have 
been in the absence of the reform.” Corcoran & Evans, supra note 25, at 360. Critics argue that 
this option eliminates the possibility for any school to achieve academic excellence. The concept 
can be illustrated using an excerpt from a dystopian short story: 
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren’t only equal before 
God and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter than anybody 
else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker 
than anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th 
Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance of agents of the 
United States Handicapper General. 
Tristan L. Duncan, (Handi-)Capping Equality and Excellence: The Unconstitutionality of 
Spending Caps on Public Education, 45 URB. LAW. 183, 183 (2013) (quoting KURT VONNEGUT, 
HARRISON BERGERON (1961)). 
 29. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 15, at 9 (collecting studies “linking educational reform to the 
decline in spending per pupil” by suggesting that less local control means less “popular support 
for education,” and less overall funding, and perhaps that centralized education funding places 
the education sector in direct competition “with other state expenditures for funds, and, as a 
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As public funding fell, private fundraising grew.30 While schools have 
long looked outside the public sphere to tap additional sources of 
revenue,31 the bake sales and car washes of yore are gradually being 
outpaced by sophisticated fundraising organizations.32 The 
organizations, termed “education support organizations” (ESOs) for 
purposes of this analysis, come in a variety of forms, include the 
traditional parent-teacher associations (PTAs) and alumni groups, as 
well as local education foundations (LEFs), which have grown in 
prominence since the 1980s.33 These organizations are typically tax-
 
result, the growth rate of spending per pupil will decrease over time” (citations omitted)); see also 
SUZANNE M. WILSON, CALIFORNIA DREAMING: REFORMING MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 138 
(2003) (calculating, similarly, California’s drop from fifth to forty-first); Corcoran & Evans, supra 
note 25, at 360 (noting that “more than half of California’s ‘leveling down’” has been attributed 
to the effects of education reform litigation, including a “collapse in expenditure growth” per 
student due to property tax limitations and “enrollment growth caused by immigration”).  
 30. See Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic Education in Times of 
Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1863 (2011) [hereinafter Rebell, Safeguarding] 
(observing “the unprecedented extent, depth, and durability of the current state budgetary 
difficulties” following the 2008 recession); see also Natalie Gomez-Velez, Common Core State 
Standards and Philanthrocapitalism: Can Public Law Norms Manage Private Wealth’s Influence 
on Public Education Policymaking?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 161, 176 (2016) (“The Great 
Recession of 2008 impacted state school budgets across the country, causing states to force cuts 
and seek funding support wherever they could find it.”). 
 31. See John C. Pijanowski & Dr. David H. Monk, Alternative School Revenue Sources: 
There Are Many Fish in the Sea, SCH. BUS. AFF., July 1996, at 4 (“The resulting fiscal strain has 
prompted efforts in recent years to identify and draw upon alternate, and often non-traditional, 
sources of revenue.”). See generally Michael F. Addonizio, Private Funds for Public Schools, 74 
CLEARING HOUSE 70 (2000) (noting a history of schools engaging in direct fundraising as well as 
indirect fundraising such as leasing school facilities).  
 32. Ashlyn Aiko Nelson & Beth Gazley, The Rise of School-Supporting Nonprofits, 9 EDUC. 
FIN. & POL’Y 541, 552, 563 (2014) (“[C]ommunities depend increasingly on philanthropic revenue 
to support public education.”). Although Professors Nelson and Gazley exclude local education 
fund (“LEF”) information from the group of organizations they analyze, the broader social and 
quantitative trends regarding private fundraising apply with equal force to LEFs. While it is 
admittedly difficult to draw the line between small- and large-scale private interventions against 
public budget cuts, LEFs are included in this analysis because they have grown out of the same 
trends to collect many small, local donations, rather than large-scale philanthropic grants from 
individuals or corporations. Such larger grants are not considered for the purposes of this Note. 
For a brief discussion of some concerns regarding these larger grants, see infra note 41.  
 33. Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Inequality, in TAKING 
PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27, 40 
(William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2006) [hereinafter Reich, Philanthropy]. See generally 
ELAINE SIMON, JOLLEY BRUCE CHRISTMAN, TRACEY HARTMANN & DIANE BROWN, 
RESEARCH FOR ACTION, CRAFTING A CIVIC STAGE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION REFORM: 
UNDERSTANDING THE WORK AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF LOCAL EDUCATION FUNDS 6 (2005), 
https://www.researchforaction.org/publications/crafting-a-civic-stage-for-public-education-
reform-understanding-the-work-and-accomplishments-of-local-education-funds 
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exempt 501(c)(3) organizations per the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).34 
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting that private 
donations have exacerbated existing inequalities35 in funding for public 
schools,36 but it is not yet clear whether donations result in quantifiably 
significant differences in funding.37 Early studies indicated that private 
fundraising could never make a significant difference relative to the 
gargantuan public education budget, but since that time ESOs have 
grown expansively and continue to do so.38 At any rate, studies show 
that ESOs are more frequently associated with communities of 
relatively higher socioeconomic status.39 Schools with ESOs can more 
easily afford “class-size reductions, librarians, art and music teachers, 
and Smart technology in every classroom” than schools without 
ESOs.40 Thus, ESOs work in the opposite direction of states’ efforts to 
weaken the link between socioeconomic status and quality of 
education.41  
 
[https://perma.cc/8YRK-5AQV] (providing an overview of the “roles and accomplishments of 
LEFs as they pertain to public education reform”). 
 34. Linda M. Lampkin & David D. Stern, Who Helps Public Schools: A Report on Local 
Education Funds, Urb. Inst. 5 (Nov. 2003), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
59511/410915-Who-Helps-Public-Schools [https://perma.cc/VW6N-DD39]. 
 35. USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 8. In 17 states, however, “high-poverty 
districts receive substantially (at least 5 percent) more in state and local funds than low-poverty 
districts.” Id. at 4.  
 36. See, e.g., Rob Reich, Not Very Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/not-very-giving.html [https://perma.cc/W42B-QK72] 
[hereinafter Reich, Not Very Giving] (“Private giving to public schools widens the gap between 
rich and poor. It exacerbates inequalities in financing.”).  
 37. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 559. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Reich, Not Very Giving, supra note 36.  
 41. Beyond the scope of this discussion, scholars have also presented concerns about the 
policy influence resulting from increased donations by large philanthropic organizations 
(structured as public-private partnerships, nongovernmental organizations, or venture capital 
groups), especially in the charter school context. See, e.g., Gomez-Velez, supra note 30, at 164 
(“The role of philanthrocapitalists [like Bill Gates] in the Common Core process is a striking 
example of the degree to which a small number of wealthy individuals can play a prominent role 
in education policymaking.”); Rob Reich, Repugnant to the Whole Idea of Democracy? On the 
Role of Foundations in Democratic Societies, 49 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 466, 468 (2016) [hereinafter 
Reich, Repugnant] (explaining the federal government subsidy resulting from two tax breaks: 
reduced tax liability for relatively wealthier donors, and usually tax exemption for the foundations 
themselves); Janelle Scott, The Politics of Venture Philanthropy in Charter School Policy and 
Advocacy, 23 EDUC. POL’Y 106, 115 (2009) (reflecting on the concept of education as an economic 
commodity and the expectation of returns on philanthropic investments by saying “[g]rants 
become investments, programs are ventures”). 
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This Note finds that states have not made meaningful legislative 
efforts to address the potentially inequitable consequences of private 
donations to public schools.42 It argues that state legislatures, in the 
midst of a fifty-year-old struggle to equalize school funding, are 
standing by as a thirty-year-old trend of unprecedented private 
fundraising works against those efforts. So, it is time for state 
legislatures to address private donations to public schools. The solution 
is not as simple as a flat ban on private donations because private 
donations go hand-in-hand with community engagement in education. 
As such, appropriate regulatory solutions must carefully balance the 
competing sets of values to calibrate a regime that avoids augmenting 
inequality without discouraging voluntary43 community support for 
primary and secondary public education.44 This Note argues that the 
most promising solutions accomplish this by allowing donations, 
calculating the point at which private donations would contribute to 
existing inequalities and redistributing donations beyond that 
threshold to communities less able to fundraise.  
Part I supplies the legal backdrop for this discussion, first by 
recounting efforts to equalize public school funding through reform 
litigation and, second, by examining the current governmental and 
financial structure of public secondary education. Part II finds that 
states have not enacted legislation to address funding inequalities 
corresponding to private donations to public schools, and explains why 
it is an appropriate time to do so. Part III argues that while a free-for-
all is not an appropriate solution, neither is a flat ban on private 
donations. An appropriate solution must be a compromise that 
accounts for both sets of values. Part IV proposes that the most feasible 
solution is at the state level and then applies the balancing framework 
developed in Part III to several proposed regulatory schemes for 
private donations to public schools.  
 
 42. A survey of state statutes and regulations as of December 2016, see infra Appendix A, 
shows that while almost all states explicitly acknowledge private donations to public schools, and 
nearly half of the states have explicitly acknowledged fundraising efforts by ESO-type 
organizations, no state-level regulation or statute discusses the impact of such organizations on 
existing or potential funding disparities. 
 43. The consideration of property taxes is of limited scope in this Note, and relates to how 
limits on property taxes encouraged the growth of private donations, such that it is an appropriate 
topic for consideration by state legislatures.  
 44. Others also argue that vouchers, privatized schools, and charter schools undermine 
governmental efforts to make educational funding fair, but the following discussion pertains only 
to public primary and secondary schools.  
FRISCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2017  10:11 PM 
436  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:427 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part provides a backdrop for this Note’s analysis by reviewing 
the traditional structure of education finance and the history of 
education finance reform litigation over the last fifty years. This history 
is significant because the cases articulate the most deeply held, 
competing values that have committed states to providing fair funding 
for education and have continued to animate the debates about public 
education and finance. Next, this Part further examines the changes 
stemming from this litigation, which generally reduced local control 
over the structure of public education finance in attempts to make 
funding more fair. This Part then notes some of the unintended 
consequences of those changes, arising from a desire to maintain a 
degree of local control over educational resources and quality.  
A. Challenges to Traditional Public School Financing 
To carry out their constitutional mandates to provide public 
education, all states delegate limited authority to their school districts 
to collect funding. This vests authority in approximately 14,000 local 
governing bodies nationwide.45 Usually, this delegation is in the form 
of authority to levy taxes, but it also frequently extends to the authority 
to accept gifts, donations, and bequests.46  
Although states now contribute most public funding for 
education, historically, local revenues provided the vast majority of 
funds. In the 1920s, local property taxes raised 83 percent of revenues 
for public education, and although federal and state funding increased 
following the Great Depression and World War II, local contributions 
still accounted for an average of 55.8 percent of public education 
funding between 1949 and 1969.47 The local property tax revenue 
available to a school depends on the product of the tax rate and 
property value; therefore, differences in local property values generate 
predictable peaks and valleys in the local revenues available to fund 
 
 45. School Districts, supra note 4. 
 46. For an overview of statutes discussing other types of private donations to public 
education, see infra Appendix B.  
 47. The calculations that produced these results used data from U.S. Dept. of Educ., Nat’l 
Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 152. Revenues for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by 
Source of Funds: Selected Years, 1919–20 Through 2002–03, DIG. EDUC. STAT. (2005), https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_152.asp [https://perma.cc/L2SD-ZR6J]. 
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schools.48 For example, in 1971, expenditures by New Jersey school 
districts displayed wide variation that corresponded to local property 
values. On average, its 578 school districts spent about $1000 per 
student annually, but fourteen of its districts, in communities with 
relatively lower property valuations, spent less than $700, and sixteen 
other districts, with relatively higher property valuations, spent over 
twice that amount at $1500.49  
In the last fifty years, litigants seeking fair funding for education 
have resorted to several strategies, generally classified into three 
“waves”: first, federal constitutional equity; second, state 
constitutional equity; third, state constitutional adequacy.50 These 
waves represent a loose chronological order, but the clearer and more 
important distinctions between the three waves are derived from the 
legal theories characterizing them.51 
Initially, litigants challenged the state funding systems that created 
these discrepancies in federal court on federal constitutional grounds, 
but the Supreme Court set an early outer boundary on federal judicial 
involvement in public education finance. In 1973, the Court held in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez52 that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution created no federal fundamental 
right to education, and that “individuals residing in property-poor 
school districts were not a suspect class.”53 It reasoned that the state 
policy in Texas which led to “disparities in funding across school 
districts that resulted from differences in local taxable property 
wealth” survived rational basis scrutiny, and that “[t]he consideration 
and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and 
education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the 
various States.”54 Although this decision was criticized, and although 
 
 48. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 10, at 808 (“Local funding is a product of the tax rate and the 
property wealth in a district. Because some districts have more property wealth than others, they 
are able to raise more money at any given tax rate.”). 
 49. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 197 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).  
 50. Corcoran & Evans, supra note 25, at 367. 
 51. See Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in 
School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1618–19 (2007) (“The wave metaphor is best 
used to characterize three types of funding challenges rather than three mutually exclusive 
periods.”).  
 52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 53. Id. at 18; Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green, Conceptions of Equity and Adequacy in 
School Finance, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY, supra note 
12, at 231, 234. 
 54. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58; Baker & Green, supra note 53, at 234. 
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many continue to argue that strong federal judicial intervention is 
necessary to combat pervasive patterns of school funding inequality 
between states,55 Rodriguez appears to have shut the door on federal 
remedies for disparate funding.56  
Disappointed federal court litigants seeking to hold somebody 
accountable started to turn to state constitutional law and began the 
state constitutional equity wave of litigation.57 Each state’s constitution 
contains language requiring the legislature to provide a public school 
system of some kind.58 The exact language in each state’s constitution 
varies,59 but the language is always abstract. For example, in 
Minnesota, “it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and 
uniform system of public schools.”60 Similarly, North Carolina’s 
 
 55. Calls to recognize a federal fundamental right to education appear with relative 
frequency but, for better or for worse, do not appear to have gained much traction. A recent 
lawsuit out of Michigan, however, puts a new spin on this argument and argues for a fundamental 
right to literacy. Ryan Felton, Detroit Civil Rights Lawsuit Attempts To Assert a Constitutional 
Right to Literacy, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2016 7:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/14/detroit-civil-rights-lawsuit-constitutional-literacy-education 
[https://perma.cc/53ZX-N68F]. 
 56. Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015) (“As in Rodriguez, we are 
loathe to disturb a matter better left to the states . . . .”). Plaintiffs in Petrella attempted to pry 
open the door Rodriguez closed, using Rodriguez footnote 107, in which the Court left open the 
question of whether caps on local tax revenue are constitutional. Id. at 1262–63. Parents brought 
suit after a local public school faced budget cuts that would eliminate salaries for foreign language 
instructors, and a school official informed parents that Kansas law made it illegal for the 
community to raise the additional funds—about $25 per household—to cover the shortfall. Id. at 
1253–54; Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Tristan L. Duncan T’84: When Failure Is Success in 
Constitutional Litigation, YOUTUBE (Nov. 16, 2016), https://youtu.be/nBZdDx3kYDY [https://
perma.cc/N3P4-PKS2]; Telephone Interview with Tristan Duncan, Partner, Shook, Hardy & 
Bacon (Nov. 8, 2016). The Tenth Circuit, however, was not persuaded and found that the Kansas 
law passed the rational basis test because it “promot[ed] equity in education funding,” a legitimate 
government interest. Petrella, 787 F.3d at 1266–67. Incidentally, the Tenth Circuit concluded the 
parents did not have meritorious constitutional claims, in part because the parents could “donate 
as much money as they wish[ed]” to their school district, by sidestepping the taxation system. Id. 
at 1258. 
 57. Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 500–
02 (2014). 
 58. This proposition has been contested. See, e.g., Jeffery Omar Usman, Good Enough for 
Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 
ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1465 n.3 (2010) (“It is periodically asserted in scholarly publications that the 
Mississippi Constitution is the sole exception in that it does not contain an education clause. That 
view is incorrect.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 59. For excerpts of the various states’ constitutions, see EMILY PARKER, EDUC. COMM’N OF 
THE STATES, CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 5–22 (2016), 
https://www.ecs.org/ec-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S82Z-LCX4]. 
 60. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § I. 
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constitution provides for a “general and uniform system of free public 
schools . . . wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all 
students,”61 and California’s, a “general diffusion of knowledge and 
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and 
liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable 
means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural 
improvement.”62 This relative lack of specificity was a problem in 
federal court, where the Supreme Court feared that addressing public 
education finance would venture too far beyond federal enumerated 
powers.63 No such limitation existed in state courts, where plenary 
power was available to fill textual gaps.64  
This wave of litigation, active from roughly 1973 to 1989, was 
characterized by arguments about “equity.”65 Litigants argued that 
funding formulas tied to a district’s property wealth, which resulted in 
dramatic differences in public education spending across districts, 
violated states’ constitutional equal protection clauses66 and 
educational provisions referring to uniformity and equality.67 Robinson 
v. Cahill68 is a representative state constitutional equity case from this 
era. In Robinson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the state 
had an “obligation to afford all pupils . . . a thorough and efficient 
system of education,” which the legislature had not discharged, based 
on the abovementioned “discrepancies in dollar input per pupil.”69  
 
 61. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 62. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § I. 
 63. See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence 
in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 359 (2011) (“In the Federal 
Constitution, powers are granted broadly over policy areas . . . . In contrast, state enumerations 
of power are unnecessary, as state legislatures already have all powers not ceded to the federal 
government or reserved to the people.”). 
 64. See Usman, supra note 58, at 1477–78 (determining that the contrast between federal 
government’s enumerated powers and state governments that “retain broad residual plenary 
authority” shapes state and federal constitutional decisions because “whereas the federal 
government can only act where constitutionally authorized to do so, state governments are 
generally free to act in any manner not prohibited by the United States Constitution or their state 
constitution”); see also Bauries, supra note 63, at 325 (noting that “most state constitutions 
provide a strong textual basis for an explicit Hohfeldian duty to provide for education”). 
 65. William S. Koski & Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of Educational 
Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY, 
supra note 12, at 41, 46 . 
 66. William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: 
The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 603 (1994).  
 67. Koski & Hahnel, supra note 65, at 46. 
 68. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
 69. Id. at 295. 
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Determining the appropriate remedy in an equity suit, however, is 
difficult both in theory and in practice.70 In theoretical terms, equity 
litigants must define the equity they seek, and that definition usually 
implies some degree of inequality. Providing equal funding to all 
students may be facially equal, but because it costs more to educate 
students that face academic and socioeconomic challenges,71 equal 
funding is unlikely to furnish all children with equal educational 
opportunities.72 On the other hand, providing more funding to 
compensate students for those disadvantages is challenging because it 
is, by definition, unequal. Alternatively, if equality simply means 
avoiding a direct connection between school funding and the property 
values in a community, that risks encouraging solutions that address 
the form, but not necessarily the substance, of funding inequalities.73  
Theoretical quandaries aside, equity litigation presents practical 
challenges.74 For example, New Jersey notoriously struggled to remedy 
its funding disparities, as the funding formula for its public schools 
bounced between the legislature and the courts for over thirty years.75 
When adjudicating a constitutional challenge to its own state funding 
system, the North Carolina Supreme Court pointedly mentioned the 
“protracted litigation resulting in unworkable remedies” following 
New Jersey’s equalization requirements, before concluding that the 
framers of North Carolina’s state constitution “did not intend to set 
such an impractical or unattainable goal.”76  
 
 70. Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance 
Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1204–06 (2011). 
 71. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 83 (2001); USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 
4 (“In 17 states, high-poverty districts receive substantially (at least 5 percent) more in state and 
local funds than low-poverty districts.”).  
 72. USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 4. 
 73. Baker & Green, supra note 53, at 234. 
 74. See Tang, supra note 70, at 1204–06 (observing that it is difficult to measure how much 
funding each student needs, difficult for the state to replace substantial local funding with its own 
revenues, difficult to pass legislation that redistributes property tax revenues, and difficult to 
translate a judicial description of a constitutional funding scheme into legislation that achieves 
the desired outcome). 
 75. New Jersey’s struggle has been described as “truly breathtaking,” in that the 2009 
“opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v. Burke was that court’s twentieth opinion 
over as many years,” and was preceded by a previous line of cases stemming out of Robinson v. 
Cahill, which “also yielded several opinions over the course of twenty years.” Bauries, supra note 
63, at 334. 
 76. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E. 249, 257 (N.C. 1997). North Carolina rejected an equity 
conception of the state’s constitutional guarantee, finding instead a guarantee to a minimally 
adequate level of education. Id.  
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So, perhaps partially for practical reasons, state courts have not 
been entirely receptive to arguments about equity and have not often 
struck down educational funding systems on those grounds. Although 
different studies measure different time periods and use different 
conventions to qualify a lawsuit as an equity suit, it appears that the 
second wave was successful somewhere between 32 percent and 45 
percent of the time.77 Perhaps such success rates are common for legal 
efforts attempting to make social change,78 but education finance 
reform litigants began to explore new strategies. 
Changing tactics in the late 1980s, litigants began to argue that 
insufficiently funded public education systems deprived children of a 
minimally adequate level of education such that it violated state 
constitutional education clauses.79 The third wave of state 
constitutional adequacy reform litigation abandoned equity 
comparisons between the educational resources and outcomes of 
different students in favor of the premise that state constitutions 
guaranteed all children a minimally adequate level of public education. 
A typical definition of adequacy might include language like “a specific 
level of resources required to achieve certain educational outcomes.”80 
The case best known for articulating adequacy reasoning is Rose v. 
Council for Better Education.81 In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
held that education is a fundamental right in Kentucky, and that the 
legislature is constitutionally required to provide a “substantially 
uniform” public school system dedicated to instilling certain 
“capacities” in its students.82 Following Rose’s lead, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court likewise held that the North Carolina constitution 
 
 77. Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in ACHIEVING 
HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 227 & n.53 (Timothy Ready, Christopher Edley, Jr. 
& Catherine E. Snow eds., 2002) [hereinafter Rebell, Educational Adequacy]; Tang, supra note 
70, at 1202 & n.24. It is difficult to find consistent data about the number of times state funding 
systems were judicially invalidated as compared with the total number of lawsuits challenging 
them. Reasons for this disparity include differences in methodology for defining what an 
adequacy versus an equity suit was, as well as the years covered by the study. 
 78. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2011) (explaining a long 
series of litigation efforts before the eventual victory).  
 79. See Thro, supra note 66, at 603. 
 80. Koski & Hahnel, supra note 65, at 47. 
 81. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 82. More specifically, the public school system in Kentucky was to provide its students with 
skills to “function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization” and to “compete favorably with 
their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.” Id. at 201, 212. 
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guaranteed “a sound basic education” that amounted to “sufficient 
academic and vocational skills.”83  
If a court finds the state’s public school funding system to be 
constitutionally inadequate, the typical remedy requires the legislature 
first to measure the cost of providing an adequate education for each 
student and, second, to guarantee that the state will cover the shortfall 
for districts unable to reach that amount for its students.84 This 
approach faces challenges similar to the definitional and administrative 
difficulties encountered by the state constitutional equity litigation 
approach. Yet, state courts have evidently been more receptive to 
adequacy arguments than equity arguments. Between 54 percent and 
66 percent of adequacy-based litigation reform efforts were successful 
in persuading state courts that the funding system in question violated 
the relevant state constitution.85  
While much scholarly hay has been made asserting the superiority 
of either the equity or adequacy approach,86 practically speaking, it is 
not entirely clear whether the distinction matters.87 Education reform 
litigation history is significant because, regardless of the approach, 
litigants draw upon the same set of core competing values that continue 
to guide purposeful discourse about education finance. 
 
 83. The court further explained that such skills ought “to enable the student to compete on 
an equal basis” in the future, whether that took place in higher education or employment. 
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 257 (N.C. 1997). 
 84. Koski & Hahnel, supra note 65, at 46. 
 85. Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, supra note 77, at 227; Tang, supra note 70, at 
1202 & n.24. Layering recession-era economics atop the success of adequacy litigation, Rebell 
later observed that “[a]lthough before 2008, plaintiffs had won two-thirds (twenty-three of thirty-
three) of state court adequacy decisions, their success rate has been halved in the most recent 
cases: they have prevailed in only three of the nine adequacy cases decided since 2008.” Rebell, 
Safeguarding, supra note 30, at 1889. 
 86. See, e.g., William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity 
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 547 (2006) (“[T[he recent 
shift away from equity-minded policies to adequacy-minded (or equity-neutral) policies must be 
reconsidered . . . .”); Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts are Redefining 
State Responsibility for Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
281, 284 (2007) (explaining “that although the adequacy lawsuits can be broadly conceived as 
encompassing the three components of educational funding, goals, and accountability, it is the 
requirement that a state government provide sufficient funding for a basic quality education that 
dominates the court decisions”); see also John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: 
Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2411 (2004) (concluding that between equity 
and adequacy, “[i]t is doubtful whether either side will be able to claim victory any time soon”). 
 87. Litigants often articulate their arguments borrowing from both equity and adequacy 
theories and, just as often, judicial decisions reflect the choice to borrow from both equity and 
adequacy rationales. See Weishart, supra note 57, at 478–79 (noting that “a number of courts have 
incorporated or invoked equality and adequacy in tandem”).  
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Taking the second and third waves together, education reform 
litigation has resulted in nearly every state facing some type of state 
constitutional challenge to its public education funding system.88 In 
turn, litigation appears to consistently spur educational funding reform 
in some capacity.89 Even beyond reform litigation, some state 
legislatures have attempted to improve the fairness of educational 
funding formulas absent the prompting of a court order.90 Ultimately, 
virtually every state has obligated itself to avoid a public education 
formula whereby the quality of a school is directly related to the 
property wealth of the community. States have largely attempted to 
discharge that obligation by shifting financial responsibility for 
education away from local property taxes and toward state and federal 
funding sources, recalibrating an already complicated funding scheme 
for public education.91  
B. The Consequences of Education Funding Reform Litigation 
As it was before reform litigation, state aid is calculated using 
formulas. The variation of these formulas cannot be understated.92 In 
response to reform litigation, most states initiated changes to their 
funding formulas in some capacity; typically, states limited the amount 
of local funding for schools and replaced it with ostensibly more 
equitable state funding.93 Because states have attempted to accomplish 
this in different ways, their various methodologies resist organized 
categories,94 in part because many states use a combination of several 
 
 88. Michael Podgursky, James Smith & Matthew G. Springer, A New Defendant at the Table: 
An Overview of Missouri School Finance and Recent Litigation, 83 PEABODY J. EDUC. 174, 176 
(2008) (“Only 5 states—Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah—have not had their 
state school funding mechanisms adjudicated in the courts.”). 
 89. Berry, supra note 27, at 214 (finding small or no statistically significant impact on school 
finance as a result of equity or adequacy litigation, but noting that litigation reliably leads to 
increasing centralization of funding; that is, more state and federal funding relative to local 
funding).  
 90. Corcoran & Evans, supra note 25, at 353. 
 91. Berry, supra note 27, at 214.  
 92. See generally Lawrence O. Picus, Margaret E. Goertz & Allan R. Odden, 
Intergovernmental Aid Formulas and Case Studies, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 
FINANCE AND POLICY, supra note 12, at 279 (reviewing various formulas); Deborah A. Verstegen 
& Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of School Finance Policies And Programs: An Overview, 
34 J. EDUC. FIN. 213 (2009) (providing an overview of different states funding formulas). 
 93. Richard Rossmiller, Funding in the New Millennium, in EDUCATION FINANCE IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 11, 24 (Stephen Chaikind & William J. Fowler eds., 2001). 
 94. Categorization is also challenging because different studies often describe the same 
methodology but give it different names or categorize a single state’s approach in two different 
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methodologies.95 Most states, however, use some form of a “foundation 
program,” whereby the state guarantees a “foundation amount” per 
student or teacher “unit” and compensates up to that amount if local 
funding, based on a uniform tax rate, falls short.96 Whatever the 
formula, funding is typically adjusted in some way for students who are 
disabled, have special education needs, are learning English, or come 
from lower-income households.97  
Although the amount of state aid is based in part on the amount 
of local property tax revenue,98 following education reform litigation, 
the amount of local property tax revenue available to a school district 
is frequently subject to various state-level limitations.99 These 
limitations attempt to put distance between school funding and local 
property values by replacing local with state funding. Public finance 
reform litigation, therefore, reliably led to increased centralization of 
public education, or in other words, relatively more significant 
decisionmaking and funding roles for the state and the federal 
government. This trend toward centralization gained further 
momentum after the National Commission on Excellence in Education 
published its 1983 report titled A Nation at Risk.100 This report 
 
ways. For example, one source designates Vermont’s formula as a district power equalizing 
system. Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 92, at 213. Another says it is two-tiered. U.S. DEPT. OF 
EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 1998–99: VERMONT (2001), https://nces.ed.gov/edfin/pdf/
StFinance/Vermont.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SV5-4B4Y]. Some of this confusion is likely due to 
state legislatures changing their formulas with relative frequency, making it exceedingly difficult 
to provide an overview of all fifty states at any given moment in time.  
 95. Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 92, at 213. 
 96. Id. at 215. Rather than using a foundation program, three other states use a “district 
power equalization system,” which allows school districts to tax and spend with limited discretion, 
“and the state matches differences in what is raised locally and what is guaranteed.” Id. at 216. 
Hawaii, which has one school district uses a “full funding” formula, and North Carolina uses a 
“flat grant” formula. Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 92, at 213. 
 97. Id. at 218, 221. Like the federal government, states often also have separate grants 
dedicated to these groups of students. Id. at 213. 
 98. Id. (noting that some states compensate for local property tax disparities, “leave them 
untouched, or make them worse”). For an additional layer of complexity, federal aid is based in 
part using the “average level of school spending in the state.” Gordon, supra note 12, at 325. 
 99. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 10, at 808 (“Local funding is a product of the tax rate and the 
property wealth in a district. Because some districts have more property wealth than others, they 
are able to raise more money at any given tax rate.”). 
 100. BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION 
REFORM 25–26 (2008); Gordon, supra note 12, at 328; see, e.g., Betheny Gross & Paul T. Hill, The 
State Role in K–12 Education: From Issuing Mandates to Experimentation, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 299, 307–08 (2016) (describing several pieces of legislation enacted after A Nation at Risk 
was published where federal or state authorities were setting education goals for public schools). 
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“highlighted the lagging results of United States students,” and 
resulted in cries for increased state and federal accountability.101  
With increasingly centralized funding, schools found themselves 
more vulnerable to statewide budget cuts because districts were unable 
to replace lost state revenues with local property tax revenues, which 
were now subject to limitation.102 In some cases, most notably in 
California, equalization efforts resulted in a leveling down of funding, 
and the quality of all public schools in the state suffered.103 For all 
states, even those that did not experience leveling down, economic 
recessions resulted in statewide budget cuts.104 These shortages were 
made worse by schools’ increasing responsibility to provide services 
that were historically performed by social services agencies, such as 
providing meals, coordinating with the healthcare and foster systems,105 
and instructing and caring for special needs students.106 So, schools 
began to examine fundraising options beyond traditional PTA bake 
sales and car washes.  
One solution was to form an LEF, a nonprofit charitable 
organization that raises money and provides grants to schools for 
teacher development and other programs.107 Most LEFs are organized 
at the district level, and while some are organized at the individual 
school level, those groups still often report to a districtwide umbrella 
LEF.108 LEFs joined the ranks of other school-supporting nonprofits 
 
 101. Gross & Hill, supra, note 100, at 307; see also Gordon, supra note 12, at 328–29 
(discussing the report and its effects). 
 102. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32 at 546. 
 103. For a discussion of the effects of leveling down, see supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 104. See generally MICHAEL LEACHMAN & CHRIS MAI, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES, MOST STATES FUNDING SCHOOLS LESS THAN BEFORE THE RECESSION  
(2014), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-12-13sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5LX-
A2FA]. 
 105. USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 4. 
 106. Mokoto Rich, Nation’s Wealthy Places Pour Private Money into Public Schools, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1FzDUsQ [https://perma.cc/2SLV-C3A2]. 
 107. See Janet S. Hansen, Michelle Hall, Dominic J. Brewer & Jane Hannaway, The Role of 
Nongovernmental Organizations in Financing Public Schools, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN 
EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY, supra note 12, at 336, 340 (observing that schools have 
increasingly turned to LEFs to raise supplementary funds); Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 
541.  
 108. See Phyllis de Luna, Local Education Foundations: Right for Many Schools, 79 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 385, 387–88 (1998) (“Some LEFs are more independent of the school district 
than others.”). As one report noted: 
As opposed to PTAs, PTOs, and booster clubs, LEFs typically operate at the district 
level, but they are independent of the school districts they serve. A common model for 
a LEF consists of a single foundation that serves all the schools in one district. On the 
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and did fundraising work on top of the fundraising that PTAs, alumni 
associations, and booster clubs at individual schools had been doing for 
decades.109 Together, these ESOs began to mobilize in much more 
sophisticated and significant ways in the 1980s—for example, through 
“phonathons,” “direct solicitation letters, dinners, golf tournaments, 
and auctions”—as they attempted to more effectively solicit donations 
to offset decreases in public funding.110 As public sources of funding 
become more centralized, ESOs continue to grow in popularity—
perhaps because they provide a way for communities to continue 
contributing to public education, in lieu of limited “official” local 
property tax contributions.  
II.  STATES SHOULD ADDRESS PRIVATE DONATIONS TO PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
This Part argues that states should not postpone addressing 
private donations to public schools, because at a minimum, the 
normative implications of private donations to public schools are 
concerning. It is true that studies have not conclusively demonstrated 
that private donations make a meaningful contribution to the inequity 
of school funding. It is also true that studies have not conclusively 
demonstrated that better funding makes a better school. But, as this 
Part suggests, the societal importance of education merits 
consideration in advance of firm quantitative evidence of inequality. 
Although there are similar concerns about the equitable implications 
of private funding for public goods in general, the nature of education 
and its role in society make those tensions more troubling in the 
context of private donations to public schools. For this reason, this Part 
proposes that state legislatures are the appropriate governing body to 
address donations because public schools are traditionally the state’s 
 
other hand, some LEFs and the districts they serve allow individual schools to form 
their own foundations. Another model is a single foundation that serves several 
districts in a region. 
ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.  
 109. Hansen et al., supra note 107, at 340. 
 110. de Luna, supra note 108, at 386. But see Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, The Effect of Tax and 
Expenditure Limitations on Voluntary Contributions to Public Schools 29, 38–40 tbl.2, 41–43 tbl.3 
(Apr. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597680 [https://perma.cc/
74Z5-7AXH] (finding a significant correlation between state tax and expenditure limits (TELs) 
and charitable activity by school-supporting nonprofits, but finding “no causal evidence that TELs 
either increase the probability that a school-supporting nonprofit locates within a district, or 
increase the level of voluntary contributions to public schools”).  
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responsibility, and donations threaten to undermine the efforts states 
have been making to equalize school funding.  
A. Absent Conclusive Proof of Exacerbating Inequality, Studies 
Foreshadow Trouble 
It has been difficult for scholars to quantify the fiscal impact of 
private donations, in part because of the enormity of the budget for 
public education. Because private donations comprise a small piece of 
such a large pie, there is no evidence to date that local education 
nonprofits have led to large disruptions of revenue equality across most 
schools.111 Further, the assertion that “[p]ublic schools spend more 
each year than the entire gross domestic product of every country in 
the world, except for the 16 wealthiest nations,” supports the argument 
that “private contributions are just too small to make much of a 
difference, even if public schools are lacking in money compared to 
their responsibilities.”112 Thus, measures that discourage private 
donations because they amplify funding gaps are based on admittedly 
imperfect empirics.113  
But, even studies purporting to quantify the financial impact of 
private donations use different methodology and data, which may 
explain why some studies reach contradictory conclusions. Many 
studies use data from the early 2000s, and even the most recent national 
data is from 2010.114 Age alone reduces the salience of those studies, 
 
 111. See Jay P. Greene, Buckets into the Sea, in WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS 49, 57 
(Frederick M. Hess ed., 2005) (arguing that the dollar values of $1.5 billion in private donations 
sound significant, but pale in comparison to the $400 billion public budget); Nelson & Gazley, 
supra note 32, at 545–46 (noting the “significant body of research suggest[ing] that voluntary 
contributions to public education do not constitute a viable alternative to tax revenues and are 
not sufficiently sizable to overcome government failure”).  
 112. Greene, supra note 111, at 57. Greene also argues by analogy that although “most people 
do not think of Russia as a rich country,” despite Russia producing “$433 billion in goods and 
services every year, about the same as what public schools spend,” most people would also “agree 
that offering [Russia] a mere $1.5 billion . . . would be very unlikely to change Russian policy in 
any meaningful way. It’s just too little relative to all of the resources Russia already has at its 
disposal, even if Russia also has enormous needs to satisfy.” Id. at 58.  
 113. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 545–46 (highlighting the growing role of private 
donations following the Great Recession, as demonstrated by studies in California and Florida). 
 114. Greene uses data from 2001. See Greene, supra note 111, at 49. Nelson and Gazley use 
data from 2010. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 541. One more recent study uses data from 
2013–2014 to estimate that parent teacher groups supporting a local school raised $425 million in 
that fiscal year, and examined the inequitable distribution of private donations on a local level 
within several school districts. CATHERINE BROWN, SCOTT SARGRAD & MEG BENNER, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, HIDDEN MONEY: THE OUTSIZED ROLE OF PARENT CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
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but the statewide budget cuts that followed the 2008 economic 
recession add reason to question them, as dependence on private 
resources appears to have increased simultaneously.115 If ESOs 
continue to grow at their current pace, it is possible that the resulting 
growth in private donations could outpace public funding growth and 
someday reach the point of quantitative significance.116  
Even without data of private funding contributing to funding 
inequality, evidence shows a distribution of ESOs along socioeconomic 
lines that is troubling, regardless of their quantitative significance. 
Studies show that ESOs are more likely to be organized in larger 
districts that boast relatively more educated and wealthy residents, and 
less unemployment, poverty, and single parenting.117 Some national 
ESOs have acknowledged that “in the beginning, we were organizing 
white middle class parents,” and that strategies are necessary to break 
that mold and account for diverse racial and economic realities.118 
While corporations and local businesses donate to underfunded 
districts, there is a risk that companies shy away from chronically 
underfunded rural areas,119 where they have less brand recognition, and 
from urban neighborhoods that suffer from unreliable community and 
educational infrastructures, where it is less certain that their money is 
spent efficiently.120 Although schools in areas with less property wealth 
 
SCHOOL FINANCE 5–7 (2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2017/
04/08/428484/hidden-money [https://perma.cc/SE27-49N5]. 
 115. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 552. 
 116. Michael F. Addonizio, PRIVATE FUNDING OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LOCAL EDUCATION 
FOUNDATIONS IN MICHIGAN 15 (1998) (warning that when public funds are insufficient and 
budget cuts continue, this could encourage private donations and make a difference in equity). 
 117. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 559; see also BROWN, SARGRAD & BENNER, supra 
note 114, at 5 (asserting that “the nation’s wealthiest PTAs are found in high-income school 
districts or in high-income schools within lower-income districts”). 
 118. Jacqueline Raphael & Alissa Anderson, Leading Ways: Preliminary Research on LEF 
Leadership for the Public Education Network, Urb. Inst. 12 (2002), https://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/publication/60596/410580-Leading-Ways-Preliminary-Research-on-LEF-
Leadership-for-the-Public-Education-Network [https://perma.cc/5W2W-Z6V7].  
 119. See Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications for 
Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 142 (2003) (“The industrial 
revolution, shifts in population, and the location of businesses and other taxable property led to 
disparities in taxable property, resulting local revenue, and levels of expenditure available for 
education. Small rural schools began to suffer from lack of resources.”); see also John Schomberg, 
Equity v. Autonomy: The Problems of Private Donations to Public Schools, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 143, 160 (1998).  
 120. Lucas R. Salzman, Public Goods, Private Money: The Role of Private Contributions In 
Public School Districts 45 (Mar. 31, 2014) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania), 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1207&context=curej 
[https://perma.cc/5J8M-EVXJ].  
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do receive support from ESOs, they have to work harder to achieve 
similar funding through local businesses and corporations or reach 
beyond the local community.121 This information may not show up on 
a report examining overall financial inequality, but in combination with 
the evidence of exponential growth in ESOs,122 it raises the troubling 
possibility of ESOs someday compounding the inequalities related to 
local revenue disparities and creating the sort of two-tiered public 
education system that most states have struggled to avoid for the last 
fifty years.123  
Next, studies that examine whether more money results in better 
schools do not have consistent results.124 Some studies have concluded 
that more money improves educational outcomes, though others 
conclude that, even if money does make a difference, it is not 
significant enough to determine educational outcomes. This debate, 
therefore, is a good candidate for a balanced legislative solution. If 
money matters, then freely permitting private donations to public 
schools creates an unfair advantage for students in schools receiving 
more donations, and completely prohibiting private donations reduces 
the total amount of money available to public schools and risks leading 
to a leveling down of the quality of education for all students in the 
state. If money does not matter, then private donations provide no 
advantage to their recipients and serve only to create the troubling 
appearance of inequity. On balance, then, these arguments give way to 
 
 121. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 15, at 57; see also Salzman, supra note 120, at 45 (suggesting 
that school districts with high concentrations of poverty yield lower donation revenues, perhaps 
due to operational difficulties dissuading donors from donating). 
 122. Id.  
 123. USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 4.  
 124. The Coleman report in 1966 upset long-held assumptions that more money resulted in 
better academic performance. Gross & Hill, supra note 100 at 307; see also SUPERFINE, supra note 
100, at 127 (“[T]he causal links between expenditures and educational opportunities are often 
opaque.”). But several scholars argue that money does make a difference, especially as it relates 
to teacher quality. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 71, at 83 (arguing that the disappointing results 
of increased Title I funding increases does not make money irrelevant); Michael F. Addonizio, X-
Efficiency and Effective Schools: A New Look at Old Theories, 35 J. EDUC. FIN. 1, 2 (2009) 
(discussing research linking increased funding and teacher quality to student achievement); Kevin 
Carey & Elizabeth A. Harris, It Turns out Spending More Probably Does Improve Education, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2hfv3YM [https://perma.cc/X8D5-PRV3] (noting poor 
school districts that received additional money saw more academic improvement than peer 
districts); Is There a Better Way to Pay for America’s Schools?, NPR (May 1, 2016 7:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/05/01/476224759/is-there-a-better-way-to-pay-for-americas-schools 
[https://perma.cc/XZ2M-KX5W] (“[M]oney, spent wisely and consistently, can improve the lives 
and outcomes of disadvantaged students.”).  
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each other and provide additional reason for states to address private 
donations to public schools.  
One last reason to address the inequitable implications of private 
donations even before solid quantitative grounding is the fact that 
schools themselves seem to take fundraising and its effects seriously. 
Some schools and districts even hire outside consultants to help them 
raise money through foundations.125 At least one district’s failure to 
establish foundations has resulted in financial difficulty and 
inequality,126 and by and large, LEFs seem to be a solution to budget 
cuts that are on the table for most schools. Further, some ESOs have 
acknowledged a responsibility to address equity concerns,127 which is 
persuasive evidence that those concerns have merit. 
B. Private Donations to Public Schools Require More Complex 
Analysis Than Private Donations to Other Public Goods 
The debate about private donations to public schools fits into a 
larger debate about private funds for the provision of public goods, 
generally.128 Many argue that the line between public and private goods 
has always been a blurry one. For example, Andrew Carnegie famously 
founded the public library system with private money, and hospitals 
that historically relied on public funding have increasingly turned to 
private funding since the 1980s.129 Neither of these sorts of donations 
 
 125. Arthur H. Roach, Fundraising Basics for Private School Facilities, Nat’l Clearinghouse 
for Educ. Facilities 1 (2009), http://www.ncef.org/pubs/fundraising.pdf [https://perma.cc/892C-
2PJ7] (suggesting public schools fundraising for capital improvements should hire a consultant to 
assist). 
 126. San Diego’s failure to establish an LEF resulted in a fragmented collection of school-
level LEFs. Lynn Jenkins & Donald R. McAdams, Philanthropy and Urban School District 
Reform: Lessons from Charlotte, Houston, and San Diego, in WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, 
supra note 111, at 129, 153. 
 127. Raphael & Anderson, supra note 118, at 3 (noting one former LEF director’s recollection 
that “[w]hen I look back on our early organizing efforts, [I realize] we were organizing middle-
class white parents. Now . . . we recognize the need to reach the lower class in order to break the 
cycle of dropouts”). 
 128. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 517–19 
(2016) (observing that privatization’s “advocates argue that outsourcing work to private firms is 
more efficient than relying on bloated government bureaucracies,” while “[c]ritics . . . contend 
that any efficiency gains come at an intolerable cost to democratic and programmatic 
accountability” (footnotes omitted)). 
 129. Jane Haderlein, Unleashing the Untapped Potential of Hospital Philanthropy, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 541, 542 (2006) (“A minor funding source for nonprofit community hospitals in 
recent decades, philanthropy is now gaining traction as a viable and available alternative source 
of much-needed capital.”); Cagla Okten & Burton A. Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in 
Private Nonprofit Markets, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 255, 261 n.6 (2000) (“In the hospital industry, the 
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appear to inspire outrage; in fact, they are often seen as innovative. An 
ESO director predicted a similarly optimistic future for public school 
fundraising, noting that “[y]ears ago, no one would have considered 
private fund raising for hospitals, and look where that’s at now.”130 
Private support for public education is not new either. Private 
donations to public universities are common, and in the South during 
Reconstruction, private philanthropist Julius Rosenwald paved the 
way for educational gains for African Americans by building primary 
schools and negotiating with state governments to eventually take 
them over.131 In spite of this history, however, there is reason to be 
more careful about private donations to public schools than to other 
public goods. The “market” interaction between a state’s constituents 
and its schools is quite different than the interaction between 
constituents and hospitals. It is likely easier for a constituent to choose 
a different library, hospital, or public university to better suit one’s 
needs than to choose a different public primary or secondary school. 
For example, unlike schools, individuals are not generally 
predesignated to seek services at a specific hospital based on their 
addresses, and it is generally unnecessary to fill out a transfer request 
or get approval to receive services at the individual’s hospital of 
choice.132 So, it is more imperative that the state play an active role in 
managing the quality of public education services.  
 
fundraising percentage fluctuated in the narrow range of 0.1 to 0.2% throughout the 1982–1988 
period, but increased to 0.3% in 1989 and remained essentially stable thereafter.”); Susan 
Stamberg, How Andrew Carnegie Turned His Fortune into a Library Legacy, NPR (Aug. 1, 2013 
3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/01/207272849/how-andrew-carnegie-turned-his-fortune-
into-a-library-legacy [https://perma.cc/PA3T-9XFB]. 
 130. Sarah Carr, Private Funds Padding Public School Coffers: Gifts Cover Shortfalls But 
Raise Concerns of Education Inequalities, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 2004, at A01.  
 131. David Strong, Pamela Barnhouse Walters, Brian Driscoll & Scott Rosenberg, 
Leveraging the State: Private Money and the Development of Public Education for Blacks, 65 AM. 
SOC. REV. 658, 673 (2000) (explaining that Rosenwald built schools with privately raised funds, 
on the condition that the state treat such schools like all other state-established public schools, or 
in other words, “continuing to sustain and operate it”); see also Peter Frumkin, Strategic Giving 
and Public School Reform, in WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, supra note 111, at 275, 275 
(explaining that Rockefeller, through higher education, and Carnegie, through public libraries, 
“embraced the more difficult goal of remedying the underlying forces that made social welfare 
agencies necessary” rather than participating in traditional almsgiving). 
 132. See, e.g., Transfer Requests, MOLOLLA RIVER SCH. DIST. (Jan. 31, 2017), 
http://www.molallariv.k12.or.us/parents/transfer_requests [https://perma.cc/5UMA-ZUHP] 
(providing paperwork for inter-district transfer applications); Student Transfer Requests, N. 
THURSTON PUB. SCHS. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nthurston.k12.wa.us/transfers [https://
perma.cc/W8G2-GPGB] (explaining procedure for transfer requests). A person’s choice of 
medical providers can be restricted by insurance coverage, or lack thereof, which may well 
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Further, acquiescing to private donations for schools, based simply 
on the historical precedent of private donations for hospitals, relies on 
an imperfect analogy. Private donations to public hospitals became 
more popular in the 1980s, after “a number of public hospitals had well-
publicized financial crises” due in part to higher medical costs and cuts 
to public funding.133 In this respect, the history of hospitals sounds quite 
similar to the history of public education, but the analogy is of limited 
help in making normative assessments. The mixture of public and 
private funding for hospitals seems to have fluctuated over time in 
response to an unpredictable funding environment because, unlike 
public schools, hospitals lack comprehensive statutory provision.134 
Unlike public schools, hospitals are not power players in a state’s 
budget. Because such a huge proportion of the budget is spent on 
education, legislation about funding for public education shapes the 
state’s economic environment in a way hospital funding never could.135 
Thus, regardless of whether a laissez-faire approach is appropriate 
regarding private donations to public hospitals, that approach is not 
appropriate regarding public education.  
Next, because of the societal role of education, a voluntary 
contribution to a school feels different than a voluntary contribution to 
another public good, like an art museum. The donor likely benefits in 
some way from both public donations; for that matter, it is debatable 
whether any charitable donation is devoid of selfish motivations.136 But 
perhaps a donation to the school one’s children attend is less altruistic 
than a comparable donation to an art museum. Donating to the school 
returns a tangible benefit back to the donor’s children along with a 
defined school community to which its members are assigned. A 
donation to an art museum benefits the donor no more than it benefits 
 
correlate with socioeconomic status. Such restrictions are beyond the scope of this discussion, 
which focuses on direct governmental regulation of access to public goods. 
 133. Email Correspondence with Emily M. Kern, Ph.D. candidate, History of Science, 
Princeton University (Dec. 20, 2016) (on file with author) (citing CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE 
CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S HOSPITAL SYSTEM; and then ROSEMARY 
STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE 20TH CENTURY).  
 134. Id. Interestingly, Kern notes that in the face of irregular public funding, many state 
hospitals “seem to be survivors because they’re plugged into the state educational systems” 
through a medical school. Id. 
 135. Id.; see also YUDOF ET AL., supra note 10, at 806 (explaining that states dedicate 20 
percent of their overall budgets to education). 
 136. See, e.g., James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 468 (1990) (arguing that charitable donors are not purely 
altruistic and instead prefer to make donations that maximize the “warm glow” they feel from 
making the donation). 
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the community, the members of which self-select, either choosing to 
take advantage of the benefit by visiting the museum or not. On the 
other hand, perhaps a donation to the local public school is more 
altruistic than spending that money hiring a private tutor, because 
other children at the school will benefit from the additional donated 
resources, and the community as a whole derives benefits from better 
education. Because the policy implications of private donations to 
public schools are closer and more nuanced than private donations to 
other public goods, these arguments are unlikely to resolve themselves. 
State legislatures, therefore, must sift through the arguments and make 
an executive policy decision about the appropriate role of private 
donations to public schools.  
C. State Legislation Is the Appropriate Way to Address Private 
Donations to Public Schools 
Several school districts have independently enacted policies that 
attempt to offset the inequitable implications of private donations by 
requiring a portion of donated funds to be directed toward the other 
schools in the district. A federal entity managing this aspect of public 
education finance could offer advantages over state-level 
management137 as interstate disparities in overall public education 
funding are certainly alarming,138 and after all, any ESO that qualifies 
as 501(c)(3) charitable organizations receives substantial tax subsidies 
from the federal government.139 But, the federal government has 
demonstrated little interest in addressing ESOs beyond the existing 
 
 137. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 959, 1006–12 (2015) (arguing that despite limits placed on congressional authority by 
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), there is room 
for Congress to expand the federal role in education); see also Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 153–56 (2006) (arguing that the federal 
government should shoulder both fiscal responsibility and control over dictating national 
education policy); Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in 
Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1424 (2014) (arguing that “localist educational 
governance structures” are detrimental to achieving fiscal or racial equality between neighboring 
school districts).  
 138. Rossmiller, supra note 93, at 24.  
 139. Reich, Repugnant, supra note 41, at 468. Further, individual tax benefits from charitable 
contributions are significantly more likely to be realized by middle- and upper-class donors, who 
are more likely to itemize their deductions—individuals who instead take the standard deduction 
get no tax benefit from charitable contributions. I.R.C. §§ 63(c), 170 (2012). 
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federal grant programs.140 And, because education is a “matter 
traditionally reserved to the states,”141 the existing legal infrastructure 
contemplates decisions by the state. This political legitimacy is 
buttressed by explicit state constitutional provisions regarding 
education. 
Local governments can, and have,142 attempted to address the 
equitable implications of private donations to public schools. Although 
perhaps individual schools or districts can adopt policies to address 
these sorts of issues in a more nimble and timely fashion than a state 
government, individual schools do not feel any intradistrict disparities 
resulting from private funding sources143 and, by the same reasoning, 
individual districts lack incentive to address interdistrict disparities. 
Ultimately, however, state legislatures have shouldered the 
burden of addressing concerns about the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and education, by centralizing funding and 
limiting the amount of local financial support.144 As it stands, private 
donations appear to allow an end run around equalization efforts, and 
ignoring private donations abdicates the states’ burden. Efforts to 
equalize funding predictably result in more state and federal funding 
relative to local funding and “overall school funding levels frequently 
drop when the state assumes greater responsibility for education.”145 
As a response to the overall drop in funding resulting from equalizing 
 
 140. The Department of Education appears to have shown interest in transparency about 
private donations to public schools by requiring states to report sources of private funding in 
census data. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying data. 
 141. Wilmore v. Annear, 65 P.2d 1433, 1437 (Colo. 1937). 
 142. See de Luna, supra note 108, at 387 (“The Portland Public Schools Foundation, for 
example, keeps 33% of the funds raised by its member foundations to equalize the benefits of its 
activities in all the schools in the district.”); Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32 at 563 (“California’s 
Santa Monica-Malibu, Manhattan Beach, and Palo Alto school districts recently adopted policies 
to pool voluntary contributions at the district level for redistribution across all schools.”); Lynh 
Bui, Montgomery Examines Fairness of Private Funding for School Projects, WASH. POST (Aug. 
11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/montgomery-examines-fairness-of-
private-funding-for-school-projects/2013/08/11/50ffee5c-f61b-11e2-aa2e-4088616498b4_story.
html?utm_term=.031c89e8a273 [https://perma.cc/DV63-QC3M] (reviewing local efforts to 
control for inequitable efforts from private donations). 
 143. ANDREW STARK, DRAWING THE LINE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN AMERICA 66 (2010); 
see also YUDOF ET AL., supra note 10, at 875–76 (observing district-level policies to offset 
inequities in donations, and noting that courts and policymakers are less inclined to remedy 
intradistrict disparities because their causes are less clear). 
 144. Rossmiller, supra note 93, at 24. 
 145. Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 755, 812 (2004). 
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efforts, there was a predictable increase in ESO activity that 
corresponded to increases in private donations.146  
So, with reliance on private funding unlikely to slow, and with 
lingering questions about the equitable implications of such donations, 
the issue is ripe for evaluation by states. The results of the survey in 
Appendix A show that most states have broadly authorized private 
donations to public schools, and many states have endorsed ESOs 
specifically.147 The results of the survey also show that there is not any 
state-level regulation about how private donations might implicate fair 
funding for education. This is inconsistent with efforts that most states 
have taken to put distance between the quality of public education and 
the property wealth in any given district.148 
III.  RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS FOR REGULATING PRIVATE 
DONATIONS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
This Part describes competing arguments about private donations 
to public schools. It is easy to characterize private donations to public 
schools as yet another instance of wealthy parents jockeying to better 
position their own children at the expense of others and erecting 
barriers between themselves and the less fortunate by building a two-
tiered educational system. It is also easy to characterize a community 
rolling up its sleeves and fundraising to offset public funding cuts as a 
classic example of civic engagement.149 The stories on the ground do 
not seem to fit perfectly into either narrative. This Part submits that 
consideration of the values on both sides of the debate is critical to 
reaching an appropriate solution.  
 
 146. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 543. 
 147. The consistent explicit provision of authority to accept donations may echo general 
legislative assumptions that wealth redistribution is somewhat more palatable if it directs funds 
toward lower-income school districts. This principle is also evident in some states’ intestacy laws. 
For example, in Maryland, if an estate passes through intestacy, and there are no qualified heirs 
“the net estate shall be converted to cash and paid to the board of education in the county in 
which the letters were granted, and shall be applied for the use of the public schools in the 
county.” MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-105 (LexisNexis 2011). Professor Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman generously assisted in the development of these suggestions. 
 148. For example, at least one state has explicitly acknowledged equity considerations as they 
relate to local tax contributions. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.500.050 (West 2017) (“[T]he 
value of permitting local levies must be balanced with the value of equity and fairness to students 
and to taxpayers, neither of whom should be unduly disadvantaged due to differences in the tax 
bases used to support local levies.”). 
 149. Telephone Interview with Tristan Duncan, supra note 56. 
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First, this Part examines the troubling implications of freely 
permitting private donations in light of states’ efforts to equalize 
funding for public education. Next, this Part examines the equally 
troubling implications of a flat ban on private donations in light of the 
positive externalities they generate and suggests that the appropriate 
solution is not so simple as a choice between a flat ban or a free-for-all.  
A. The Trouble with Permitting Private Donations 
Beyond the concerns discussed in Part II, which lead to the 
preliminary conclusion that states should address private donations to 
public schools, other troubling consequences await public school 
systems that allow unfettered private donations. First, if private 
donations could someday create a two-tiered system of public schools, 
it would contravene their nature as a public good. Second, private 
donations offer an end run around the political process, undermining 
the democratic legitimacy of school funding, failing to provide schools 
with predictable and accountable funding, and creating perverse 
incentives for states to underfund schools.  
1. The Drawbacks of a Two-Tiered Public School System.  In 1997, 
Chancellor Rudy Crew was concerned that allowing P.S. 41 parents to 
pay for a teacher’s salary would encourage a two-tiered system of 
public schools.150 One hundred years before Crew turned the parents 
at P.S. 41 away, philosopher and education reformer John Dewey 
reasoned that “[w]hat the best and wisest parent wants for his child, 
that must we want for all the children of the community. Anything less 
is unlovely, and left unchecked, destroys our democracy.”151 Crew’s 
reasoning for his New York school appears prescient. Fifteen years 
after the parents of P.S. 41 were turned down, inequality due to private 
donations seems to have come to pass, at least for some districts. 
California’s efforts to equalize may have been thwarted by fundraising: 
one district, which raises $2300 in donations per student annually, is 
able to afford “art and music teachers, and Smart technology in every 
classroom,” and another district less than twenty miles away, that 
fundraises only $100 per student annually, can barely afford the 
basics.152 
 
 150. Hartocollis, supra note 19, at A1. 
 151. JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 19 (1907). 
 152. Reich, Not Very Giving, supra note 36, at A25. 
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Crew and Dewey might reasonably be troubled by the 
juxtaposition of such differently situated school districts. When the 
government provides a service to any one of its constituents, those 
services are presumed to be offered at the same level to all of its 
constituents—“the delivery of a higher level of service to the wealthy 
side of town rather than to the poor side of town is considered an 
inequity to be remedied.”153 Thus, if permitting private donations to 
public schools risks the provision of different calibers of a public good, 
then those donations work against core societal values.  
Further, these disparities do not exist because individual parents 
lack motivation to support local schools. Lower income parents face 
the prospect of “pull[ing] all of the weight by themselves,” in schools 
that do not already have established channels for community 
support,154 compounding the difficulty with current distributions of 
ESOs along socioeconomic lines. A lower-income parent with a less 
flexible work schedule, and relatively less time and money to spare, can 
more easily contribute to an ESO that already exists, and may not have 
the know-how or resources to get one started. As an example, before 
ultimately suing the state, one group of Kansas parents held a 
brainstorming session in the school gym to determine the best 
community response to budget cuts. During the meeting, one parent 
stood up to explain that even though she had only $25 left each week 
after paying her bills, she would rather put it toward her children’s 
education than anything else, even groceries, because education was 
her children’s path to a successful future—a path that had been 
unavailable to her.155 It could be easier to accept a two-tiered system if 
the private donations giving rise to it perfectly corresponded to a 
community’s desire to support for education, but that does not appear 
to be the case.  
2. The Drawbacks of Avoiding the Political Process.  Leaving the 
door wide open for fundraising outside the public sphere reduces the 
incentives for middle- and upper-class parents to put pressure on the 
 
 153. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1197 
(1996). 
 154. KAHLENBERG, supra note 71, at 80–81.  
 155. Telephone Interview with Tristan Duncan, supra note 56. This particular example relates 
to increasing property taxes, which lends credence first to the idea that it is not only wealthy 
parents interested in contributing money to avoid the repercussions of budget cuts, and second to 
the idea that an existing system to channel community support can provide greater opportunities 
for parents of all socioeconomic backgrounds to contribute.  
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state to fund education fully through the political process.156 
Discouraging private donations, or at least not actively encouraging 
them as the Tenth Circuit did in Petrella v. Brownback,157 is therefore 
the more democratically legitimate option and results in transparent 
policy choices. If middle- and upper-class parents have an option other 
than making their way through bureaucratic red tape, it is entirely 
rational for them to pick the less difficult and potentially more effective 
option of private donations. Utilizing the political process, however, 
raises the bar for students across the state, whether or not their parents 
are on the front lines pushing for legislative action. In this sense, 
permitting unlimited private donations is a “laundering” of the same 
inequitable funds that otherwise would have been raised by property 
taxes.  
Additionally, private fundraising is vulnerable to even more 
unpredictability than public income streams, due to the voluntary 
nature of donations. Relying on private donations makes it difficult for 
schools to plan long-term projects, even though the fundraising 
methodologies of a sophisticated ESO may be relatively predictable in 
practice. It is likely preferable to redirect those financial commitments 
into a funding vehicle that features more certainty than almost 
anything else—taxes.158 Further, the reporting requirements for ESOs 
range from vague, to limited, to nonexistent—so not only are donations 
unpredictable in the first place, but it is difficult to account for them 
after the fact. Again, some information is available through federal 
 
 156. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 71, at 84 (observing that a benefit to socioeconomic 
integration in schools is that “middle-class parents will use their political weight to bring greater 
equality of resources”). 
 157. Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1258 (10th Cir. 2015). In Petrella, parents 
attempted to raise local property taxes to offset budget cuts in Shawnee Mission school district, 
estimated to cost about $25 per household, but were blocked because Kansas law capped how 
much revenue schools could derive from local property taxes in an effort to equalize funding. 
Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, supra note 56. The parents sued, alleging violations of their Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in directing their children’s upbringing and education. Id. The Tenth 
Circuit was not persuaded, finding that the Kansas law passed the rational basis test because it 
“promot[ed] equity in education funding,” a legitimate government interest. Petrella, 787 F.3d at 
1258. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the parents did not have meritorious constitutional claims, 
in part because the parents could “donate as much money as they wish[ed]” to their school district, 
by sidestepping the taxation system. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (Wash. 1978) (“[C]ompliance 
with Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 can be achieved only if sufficient funds are derived, through 
dependable and regular tax sources, to permit school districts to provide ‘basic education’ through 
a basic program of education in a ‘general and uniform system of public schools.’”); 1 MEMOIRS 
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 619 (1840) (“[B]ut in this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except 
death and taxes!”). 
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reporting requirements, as Form 990s are required for 501(c)(3) 
organizations, but only for those that exceed $50,000 in revenues 
annually.159 Plenty of ESOs come short of this threshold, and plenty 
more PTAs and booster clubs do, too.  
While forty-four states required financial reporting from school 
districts as of 1996, there is reason to think those sorts of reports do not 
capture the financial activity of outside ESOs.160 Making matters worse, 
it appears that schools have motivation to be discrete about private 
donations received—districts are only required to report “known” 
sources of income, and including private donations in that information 
would likely result in decreased public funding.161 Lastly, if a school is 
able to close a budgetary shortfall using private fundraising, this could 
create a perverse incentive for the state or the district to underfund that 
school the following year. If private fundraising fills the gaps left by 
state funding, then the state and the district may feel less of an 
obligation to use their resources to solve budget shortfalls in the future, 
instead relying on the school’s ability to address its own budget 
problems using private donations.  
B. The Trouble with Prohibiting Private Donations 
The solution to this dilemma is not as simple as banning private 
donations to public schools, because private donations to public 
schools is not a straightforward narrative about wealthy children 
getting more extravagant schools. And, beyond the consideration that 
public schools chronically lack sufficient resources, voluntary financial 
contributions go hand-in-hand with other academic success factors that 
are not purely financial. Additionally, it can be difficult to draw the line 
between what is financial and what is not.  
As mentioned above, narratives that private donations are by the 
rich people, for the rich people, are overly simplistic. A parent’s desire 
to contribute discretionary income toward their child’s education 
transcends socioeconomic status, and in that case, it is “absurd to make 
the argument that parents shouldn’t be able to give their kids as much 
 
 159. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 553–54 & n.11 (explaining the IRS filing requirement 
increases to Form 990, from annual gross receipts of $25,000 or more and assets of $1,250,000 or 
more in 2009, to $50,000 in receipts or $500,000 in assets in 2010). 
 160. Rossmiller, supra note 93, at 24. 
 161. Id. 
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as they possibly can,” however much that might be.162 ESOs can serve 
an important role in protecting parental autonomy for all income 
levels, giving all parents a way to support their child’s education 
beyond traditional, state-mandated amounts and methods. And, 
although the current socioeconomic distribution of ESOs is troubling, 
eliminating them for that reason stops ESOs just as they are figuring 
out how to come into new, needier communities. ESOs themselves are 
conscientious of their current inequitable distribution and are 
encouraging schools and districts to take leading roles in founding 
these organizations themselves—meaning that burden need not fall 
entirely on parents without the time or resources to do so.163  
Next, in financial terms, it is difficult to square a complete 
prohibition on private donations with the economic reality that states 
regularly fail to fund education fully. It is defensible to conclude that a 
state, unable to fund education fully, is in no position to refuse private 
donations, and that private donations are “a gift horse that does not 
require dental examination.”164 Further, private donors mean well. 
Financially supporting education is “acting on noble and wholesome 
impulses, which public policy should generally encourage.”165 And, if 
the prohibition of donations boils down to a bleak financial future for 
public schools, middle- and upper-class parents may be more likely to 
“just send their kids to private schools and take their ball and go 
home.”166 This option leaves the schools with less money and leaves 
public entities with fewer community members holding them 
 
 162. Erin McIntyre, Should Private Funding Be Allowed in Public Schools?, 
EDUCATIONDIVE (May 27, 2016), http://www.educationdive.com/news/should-private-funding-
be-allowed-in-public-schools/419978 [https://perma.cc/57PF-WSW8]. 
 163. Raphael & Anderson, supra note 118, at 9 (describing school principals and 
superintendents as important influences in building a successful LEF); Jenkins & McAdams, 
supra note 126, at 139, 152–53 (“[A]rgu[ing] that school districts should, in fact, play a far more 
proactive role in evaluating their private donations,” and observing that divided leadership in the 
San Diego school district, demonstrated by its failure to form an LEF, weakened education 
reform efforts). 
 164. Felix Salmon, Why Charitable Donations to Public Schools Are OK, REUTERS BLOG 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/09/06/why-charitable-donations-to-
public-schools-are-ok [https://perma.cc/F296-NSFL].  
 165. KAHLENBERG, supra note 71, at 81. 
 166. Rich, supra note 106. For additional support for this assertion, see BROWN, SARGRAD & 
BENNER, supra note 114, at 11 (explaining that after a school district in Santa Monica, California, 
implemented redistributive policies, “some parents were angry that they did not have control over 
their private donations and warned they would be less likely to donate in the future”). 
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accountable. Simply leaving the public school system is also not an 
option that many middle- and lower-class families have.167  
And focusing myopically on funding equality is shortsighted. If 
detaching the wealth of a community from the quality of education 
requires truncating voluntary community support for schools, then the 
fallout from an exodus of middle- and upper-class families from the 
public school system would also have nonfinancial ramifications. 
Middle-class community norms encourage active, multifaceted support 
of education, manifested in volunteer hours and participation in school 
governance.168 These sorts of efforts benefit the school community as a 
whole,169 despite the “psychological reality” that parents may primarily 
be motivated by a desire to help their own children.170 The potential 
removal of this normative influence is concerning, because there is a 
growing body of evidence suggesting that successful academic 
outcomes depend as much on the community’s support for education 
as they do on funding.171 These arguments are buttressed by findings 
related to what has been called “x-efficiency,” the “unmeasured and 
often unobserved school practices and organizational 
characteristics”172 that have just as much, if not more, impact on 
academic outcomes. Signs point to community and parent 
involvement, both inside and outside the four walls of the school, as a 
critical indicator of academic success.173  
Lastly, private donations continue—and even increase—in the 
face of economic recessions, and there is reason to believe that such 
donations are not sensitive to changes in tax incentives or, for that 
matter, policies that limit the inequitable impacts of private 
donations.174 Simply put, decisions to donate to local schools are more 
about a desire to “give their kids as much as they possibly can,”175 and 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. KAHLENBERG, supra note 71, at 81. 
 169. Id. 
 170. STARK, supra note 143, at 69. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Addonizio, supra note 116, at 5–7.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Rob Reich, A Failure of Philanthropy, 3 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 24, 32 (2005) 
(suggesting that donations to educational institutions and hospitals are more susceptible to 
changes in the tax code than religious donations, but noting that donors with income of $50,000 
or less often are not motivated by tax incentives in the first place).  
 175. McIntyre, supra note 162.  
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less about rich people with “extra” money trying to provide exclusive 
opportunities to their children.  
C. Appropriate Solutions Require Compromise 
First, a compromise is likely more politically feasible than a 
solution that completely vindicates one side and completely defeats the 
other.176 Second, even the most vocal proponents of regulating private 
donation do not suggest that the best solution is blanket prohibition.177 
Most advocates recognize that parental financial contribution to 
schools is “inevitable” to a certain extent and is even rooted in 
admirable and desirable community support for education.178 It seems 
injudicious to conclude that either side is thoroughly wrong or 
thoroughly right.179 As noted above, school administrators like Crew 
and Fariña, may well find themselves troubled by the equitable 
principles on both sides, despite their expertise in education finance.  
Finally, having rejected the equally inappropriate solutions of flat 
bans on private donations and freely permitting private donations leads 
to the conclusion that successful solutions will be a compromise 
developed according to what each state thinks achieves the best 
balance of the values at stake: fairness, transparency, community 
engagement, accountability, and maintenance of high-quality 
education.180  
IV.  SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
To stay true to states’ hard-fought historical efforts to provide fair 
funding for public education, state legislatures can no longer ignore the 
 
 176. For a further discussion of the importance of compromise to achieving meaningful 
substantive change and political feasibility, see infra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. 
 177. STARK, supra note 143, at 68, Reich, Philanthropy, supra note 33, at 45. 
 178. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 143, at 68 (“Surely, of the two, it is better that parents raise 
money for the district than not at all.”). 
 179. To illustrate the idea that reasonable people are found on both sides of these arguments, 
Laurence Tribe worked with Tristan Duncan representing the plaintiffs in Petrella v. Brownback, 
Telephone Interview with Tristan Duncan, supra note 56, while his previous legal work suggests 
that he is an unlikely ally in Ms. Duncan’s work. See Tim Wu, Did Laurence Tribe Sell Out?, NEW 
YORKER (May 6, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/did-laurence-tribe-sell-out 
[https://perma.cc/K4W5-Y2R8] (noting Tribe’s past representation of liberal causes stand in 
apparent conflict to his recent advocacy of more conservative causes).  
 180. Other scholars have articulated similar frameworks, suggesting that the values of equity, 
adequacy, efficiency, and choice “compete with one another” but “cannot be given equal weight” 
because “an answer to one will influence the answer to another.” C. PHILLIP KEARNEY & 
MICHAEL F. ADDONIZIO, A PRIMER ON MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 64–65 (4th ed. 2002).  
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implications of private donations. In addressing private donations, 
state legislatures must calibrate an appropriate compromise between 
unregulated private donations and prohibitions against private 
donations. Such a compromise would be unnecessary if there were 
“simply” sufficient public funding for all schools. But that scenario is 
unlikely, and perhaps impossible, so this Part reviews solutions that 
attempt to balance the values surrounding the debate about private 
donations. It concludes that regulations about how donated funds can 
be used and total caps on donations are unlikely to address the 
concerns on both sides of the debate, but that strategies like partial 
caps and luxury taxes are promising, albeit imperfect, steps in the right 
direction.  
A solution that represents some sort of compromise is essential. 
School districts that have successfully enacted policies to address the 
equitable concerns about donations have expressed that the most 
workable solutions can be described as a “marriage of tensions”; that 
is, solutions that build in values from both sides, and ultimately leave 
each side neither completely satisfied, nor completely dissatisfied.181 
Compromise also offers the best chance that a solution is politically 
feasible. Some might argue that more politically feasible solutions are 
less likely to make meaningful progress in addressing equality concerns 
but, for various reasons, bolder solutions are much less likely to make 
political progress in the first place.182 To that end, several solutions 
represent feasible ways to leave most constituents partially encouraged 
and partially disappointed.  
One possible compromise is permitting private donations to pay 
for certain parts of public schooling but not others. Some school 
districts have attempted to offset the potentially unequal effects by 
distinguishing between core and noncore items of educational funding, 
prohibiting parental financial support for the former but not the 
latter.183 While this sort of approach successfully addresses concerns 
about private funds distorting a school’s ability to offer core academic 
 
 181. STARK, supra note 143, at 69. 
 182. Professor Lemos touches on this phenomenon, observing that in the context of statutory 
interpretation, “[t]he features that make methodology most law-like—its facial neutrality and its 
generality—may also, paradoxically, enhance its value as a political tool.” Margaret H. Lemos, 
The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 854 (2013) (reviewing 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS (2012)). This observation easily carries into the argument that a more facially neutral 
proposition is more politically feasible.  
 183. Hartocollis, supra note 19, at A1. 
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services, the line between core and noncore is not a bright one. Would 
a capital expenditure for a new classroom building be core? What 
about Photoshop software or 3D printers? With that approach, it is 
easy to give a core expenditure a noncore-sounding label. For example, 
a biology teaching assistant might easily be recast as a “biology 
consultant.”184 To sidestep drawing this line, some schools instead 
prohibit donations to support programs that only benefit one class or 
one grade, but permit donations to support schoolwide programs.185 
This approach avoids intraschool inequity, and addresses the equitable 
concerns stemming from a donor’s ability to exercise control over such 
donated funds, but it does not address concerns about inequality 
between schools in the same district or state. 
Turning next to statewide spending or donation caps, such 
solutions are appealing because they are simple, but they are unlikely 
to address the goals of compromise, political feasibility, and fair 
funding, for the same reason. For example, one approach has been to 
refuse donations, for any purpose or amount, which undermine a 
school district’s authority or educational mission.186 Such a malleable 
standard may be flexible enough to result in fair funding, but this 
malleability creates uncertainty for potential donors who may prefer to 
understand the rules for making donations ahead of time. As another 
approach, some school districts require school board approval for, or 
flat-out do not accept, donations over a certain amount—though at 
least one school district policy does not require reporting for gifts 
under $50,000.187 But it is difficult to set, and easy to criticize, a simple 
cap to apply to each school’s unique economy.  
 
 184. See, e.g., Susan Riddell, The Place To Be, KY. TCHR., Sept. 2010, at 7, 7 
https://dspace.kdla.ky.gov/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10602/11230/Sept10KyT.pdf?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/R9E9-YS2W]. 
 185. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-14-13 (2017) (indicating that none of the ESO-type 
“funds may be used for capital acquisition, debt retirement, or ordinary expenditures or 
expenses”). For other examples of schools limiting donations that benefit only one class or grade, 
see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 186. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2-604 (West 2017) (requiring that “the fundraising 
process [be] consistent with the goals and mission of the school or school district”). It is not clear 
what would make a process inconsistent with such goals, and there does not appear to be case law 
associated with the statutes.  
 187. CHI. BD. OF EDUC., CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL § 403.3 (2004), 
http://policy.cps.edu/download.aspx?ID=3 [https://perma.cc/Y8DH-7PKF]. The Montgomery 
County Board of Education in Maryland also requires approval for projects above $50,000, and 
further prohibits any private money from funding “teachers and other staff members.” Bui, supra 
note 142. 
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A more effective approach may be one step away from total caps. 
Partial caps appear to be successful policy choices for school districts 
and ESOs that have taken initiative to account for the inequitable 
implications of private donations.188 To address concerns that some 
communities have better access to these donations than others, once 
donations reach a certain threshold, a percentage of the donation is 
sent to the state level to support schools with fewer resources.189 This 
sort of compromise maintains parental and local enthusiasm to 
financially support their schools and encourages the kind of grassroots 
support that is critical to community engagement in local government.  
Similarly, it may be effective to implement a “luxury tax”190 on 
schools that receive donations exceeding a statewide threshold. 
Schools may collect donations beyond that level, but it would be taxed 
at a “steeply graduated rate,” and the excess funds would be 
redistributed to other schools in the state that are unable to fundraise 
to that level.191 Because this approach, like partial caps, indicates a 
maximum above which some sort of redistributive principle applies, its 
results are similar. It may have a rhetorical advantage that partial caps 
lack, because it does not purport to limit the donation in any way, 
improving its political feasibility. Measures to control spending are 
“more effective if [they] take[] the form of taxation rather than an 
absolute prohibition of luxury spending.”192 
Professional athletics may lend surprising insight in this area.193 
Major League Baseball implemented a luxury tax for teams that pay 
salaries exceeding a certain threshold, reasoning that it fosters fairer 
 
 188. STARK, supra note 143, at 69 (referring to Portland’s rule that 33 percent of a school’s 
donations are sent back to the districtwide fund as a “marriage of tensions . . . equity folks say it’s 
too little; some parents say it’s too much”); see also Kevin Lynch & Amy Carlsen Kohnstamm, 
Portland Public Schools: School Equity? There’s More to That Story, OREGONIAN, Oct. 5, 2006, 
at B7 (describing the success of the Portland Schools Foundation’s fundraising effort and its 
distribution of funds aimed at closing the achievement gap). 
 189. For additional arguments that partial caps are better than total caps as a solution to 
inequitable private donations, see Schomberg, supra note 119, at 172–73. Schomberg’s suggestion 
is also noted in YUDOF ET AL., supra note 10, at 875–76. 
 190. “Luxury,” for reference, has been defined “as something that some people think other 
people should do without.” Norman B. Ture, Social Policy and Excise Taxes, 40 TAX NOTES 737, 
739 (1988) (quoting Henry C. Simons). 
 191. Reynolds, supra note 145, at 812. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Jeffrey D. Van Volkenburg, What Public Education Should Learn from Major League 
Baseball: Spending Caps, Luxury Taxes and Fiscal Accountability, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 237, 
240–41 (2007). 
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competition.194 Other leagues like the National Basketball Association 
have followed suit and have apparently achieved greater success in 
promoting competition using a two-pronged approach that combines a 
salary cap with a luxury tax.195 Because many states use combined 
methodologies in their funding formulas already, perhaps a combined 
approach to private donations could work well in an educational 
context too.  
Although partial caps and luxury taxes have the political 
advantage of reduced transparency, likely making it easier to gain 
legislative approval, there are drawbacks. Neither the luxury tax nor 
the “salary cap” approach does much to address concerns related to 
private donations sidestepping the political process. If parents can still 
raise unlimited funds outside the public sphere, it likely reduces 
incentives to pressure state governments to raise the standards for 
education across the board. These strategies also do little in the way of 
preventing states from counting on schools and districts to backfill 
insufficient state funds with donated funds. And, these solutions may 
not yield immediate significant decreases in school funding inequality. 
But taking a step toward fairness by way of partial caps or luxury taxes 
is better than nothing. More effective, but politically infeasible, options 
may as well be “nothing.”  
At a minimum, states could start by gathering more information. 
A preliminary step in the right direction would be to require additional 
reporting and transparency for private donations.196 Currently, 
501(c)(3) entities do not have to report at a federal level unless their 
revenues exceed $50,000. All states seem to provide tax incentives for 
organizations defined similarly, if not exactly the same, as 501(c)(3).197 
Although as of 2006, school districts are required to report any 
 
 194. William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball, 
Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 77 (2004). See generally Kristi Dosh, 
Note, Can Money Still Buy the Postseason in Major League Baseball? A 10-Year Retrospective on 
Revenue Sharing and the Luxury Tax, 3 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2007) (providing a 
history of Major League Baseball’s luxury tax). 
 195. Gould, supra note 194, at 93; Richard A. Kaplan, Note, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A 
Misguided Regulatory Regime, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2004). 
 196. Michael F. Addonizio, Salvaging Fiscal Control: New Sources of Local Revenue for 
Public Schools, in BALANCING LOCAL CONTROL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR K–12 
EDUCATION 245, 258 (Neil D. Theobald & Betty Malen eds., 2000). 
 197. John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax 
Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 855–56 (1993); see also W. 
HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE G. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION?: THE CHALLENGE 
TO CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION (1988) (containing a survey of state tax exemptions for 
charities). 
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contributions and donations from private sources for federal census 
purposes,198 there do not appear to be uniform efforts for this kind of 
reporting on a state level.199 This suggestion provides maximum 
political feasibility because it would merely tinker with the reporting 
ceiling, and decisions about paper pushing are less emotionally fraught. 
It takes a direct step only in the direction of transparency and a more 
indirect step toward fairness, but it does not seem to change incentives 
for community engagement one way or the other. Further, it does not 
appear to impact existing school funding gaps in education directly, 
though public disclosure may well be an effective tool to encourage 
more fortunate schools or districts to voluntarily redirect some of their 
donated funds to schools with fewer resources. Overall, the only clearly 
incorrect solution is no solution at all. While partial caps or luxury taxes 
appear to offer more advantages than total caps and restrictions on 
donations’ uses, any of the presented strategies, or combinations 
thereof, are worth consideration by state legislatures. 
CONCLUSION 
More than thirty years into a substantial increase in ESOs 
contributing private funds to public education, there is a pressing need 
for state legislatures to articulate a coherent regime for private 
donations to public schools. While there is not yet substantial data 
assessing whether private donations augment inequality, there is 
reason to suppose this data may someday exist due to the 
unprecedented growth in ESOs and financial pressures resulting from 
the 2008 financial recession that are not accounted for in previous 
studies. Further, ESOs appear to correlate with traditional links 
between the wealth of a community and the quality of its education, 
which is a link that state governments have long been attempting to 
sever. A careful legislative solution requires dutiful acknowledgement 
of the values animating each side of the debate and achieves a 
calibrated compromise.  
 
 198. Nelson & Gazley, supra note 32, at 552. 
 199. Several states require separate accounting for public and private funds in some fashion. 
See ALA. CODE § 16-13A-6 (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1011.765 (West 2017); GA. COMP. R. & 
REGS. 560-12-2-.79 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1663 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:414.3 
(2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-29-510 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-112 (West 2017); WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE 392-138-017 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-13-310 (West 2017). Some statutes do 
specifically mention the segregation of donated funds, however, they do not expressly invoke 
equitable concerns. The District of Columbia, though not included in this survey, also requires 
reporting of private donations. D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-121.01 (West 2017). 
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Appendix A. Existing Regulatory and Statutory Mentions of Private 
Donations 
State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level Local Level School Level 
Alabama  X X X 
Alaska  X X  
Arizona  X X  
Arkansas  X X  
California  X X  
Colorado X X X X 
Connecticut  X X  
Delaware  X X X 
Florida X X X  
Georgia  X X  
Hawaii  X   
Idaho  X   
Illinois  X X X 
Indiana X X X X 
Iowa X X X X 
Kansas X X X  
Kentucky  X X X 
Louisiana X X X  
Maine X X X X 
Maryland  X X  
Massachusetts  X X X 
Michigan  X X X 
Minnesota  X X  
Mississippi X X X X 
Missouri X X  X 
Montana  X X  
Nebraska  X X  
FRISCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2017  10:11 PM 
2017] PRIVATE DONATIONS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 469 
 
  
State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level Local Level School Level 
Nevada X X X X 
New 
Hampshire 
 X X X 
New Jersey X X X  
New Mexico X X X  
New York   X X 
North Carolina X X X  
North Dakota X X X  
Ohio X  X X 
Oklahoma X X X  
Oregon  X X  
Pennsylvania   X  
Rhode Island  X X  
South Carolina  X X  
South Dakota X  X X 
Tennessee X X X X 
Texas  X X X 
Utah X X X  
Vermont    X 
Virginia X X X  
Washington  X X  
West Virginia X X X  
Wisconsin X X X  
Wyoming  X X  
TOTAL 22 45 46 20 
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Appendix B. Statutory Discussion of Other Private Donations to Public 
Education 
 
As of December 2016, no state had explicitly addressed inequity related to ESO 
funding. Several states have gone to some lengths to address other education-related 
donations: 
 
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 5, § 92.250 (2009) 
“A musk ox may be loaned or donated to a public institution 
for scientific and educational purposes under terms 
approved by the commissioner and under guidelines 
approved by the board.” 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
14, § 40 (2017) 
“[G]overnment accredited schools that are open to the 
public may possess, accept donations of . . . native reptiles 
and amphibians without a permit.” 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
32390 (West 2002) 
In a program for fingerprinting kindergartners, “[t]he 
governing board may seek to obtain private funding and 
volunteer assistance in performing the fingerprinting.” 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
64b01 (2002) 
“No school district shall expend . . . moneys . . . for . . . 
litigation . . . against the state of Kansas . . . concerning 
school finance. No such moneys shall be paid, donated or 
otherwise provided . . . and used for the purpose of any such 
litigation.” 
LA R.S. 17:3403 (c) 
(West 2013) 
“[A]ny person teaching in a Montessori school who receives 
a salary paid by the government of France may receive 
additional compensation . . . whether such funds are part of 
its normal operating budget . . . or any local, state, or federal 
educational organization or foundation.” 
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 
503.460 (2017) 
“An owner of a raptor that dies may, without limitation . . . 
[d]onate the body of the raptor to any person authorized by 
permit to acquire and possess the body of a raptor . . . . If a 
taxidermist mounts the raptor: (a) The mount may be used 
in a conservation education program.” 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 200:54 (Lexis Cum. 
Supp. 2016) 
“A school district may accept gifts, grants or donations from 
foundations, organizations, or private parties to purchase 
bronchodilators, spacers, or nebulizers.” 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 189:17-a (Lexis 2011) 
“The local school board shall have the authority to accept 
the donation of flags and appliances, and to determine the 
location of the flags in the classrooms.” 
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OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
70, § 1210.200 (West 
Cum. Supp. 2017) 
“Contingent upon the availability of federal funding or 
donations from private organizations or persons made for 
this purpose, each school district shall make automated 
external defibrillators . . . available at each school. . . .” 
OR. ADMIN. R. 635-
002-0014 (2017) 
“Antlers that come into the department's possession shall 
be . . . [d]onated to nonprofit organizations, federal 
agencies, or Oregon cities, counties or state agencies for any 
purpose . . . consistent with the agency's mission including 
wildlife-related fundraising . . . . A nonprofit organization is: 
(A) An Oregon public elementary, middle or high school.” 
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 
123-170 (Cum. Supp. 
2016) 
“A falconer may donate the body or feathers of any other 
species of falconry raptor . . . . He or she may keep . . . or 
may have the body mounted by a taxidermist. He or she may 
use the mount in giving conservation education programs.” 
TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 38.017 (West. 
Comm. Supp. 2016) 
“A school district may seek and accept gifts, grants, or other 
donations to pay the district's cost of purchasing automated 
external defibrillators . . . .” 
31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 65.612 
“Breeder deer may be disposed of by . . . sale or donation to 
the holder of an educational display permit . . . .” 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 
R657-20-27 (2017) 
“The body or feathers of any other species of falconry 
raptor may be donated . . . . kept . . . or . . . mounted by a 
taxidermist. (A) The mounted raptor may be used in 
conservation education programs. . . . The body and 
feathers of a deceased falconry raptor that are not donated 
or retained must be burned, buried, or otherwise destroyed 
within 10 calendar days of the death of the bird or after final 
examination by a veterinarian to determine cause of death.” 
VT. STATE. ANN. tit. 10 
app. § 11 (2017) 
“[A] wild falconry raptor captured in Vermont that is 
incapable of surviving for an extended period in the 
wild . . . . [M]ay be euthanized in a manner that minimizes 
pain and stress, and the carcass disposed of either by 
donation to a public scientific or educational organization 
permitted to receive wild animals. . . .” 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
220-420-380 (2017) 
“The body or feathers of any other species of raptor may be 
donated . . . . The body of any raptor, except that of a golden 
eagle (Aquila chrysaetos), may be . . . mounted by a 
taxidermist. The mount may be displayed in giving 
education programs.” 
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Appendix C. Statutory Citations Underlying Appendix A Data 
 
State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
AL 
 ALA. CODE §§ 16-
3-30, -31 (Lexis 
2012); ALA. 
ADMIN. CODE r. 
290-080-092-.04 
ALA. CODE §§ 16-8-12, 13-36, 
-13-32 (Lexis 2012) 
ALA. CODE 
§ 16-3-29 
(Lexis 
2012) 
AK 
 ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 14.07.030 
(Lexis 2016) 
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
43.23.062 (Lexis 2016) 
 
AZ 
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 15-204, -
211, -212, -2042 
(West 2014) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-
1154, -1224, -2041 (West 
2014) 
 
AR 
 ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 6-16-303, 20-706 
(Lexis 2013) 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-13-
1002, -20-417, -21-101, -21-503 
(Lexis 2013); 5.4.17 ARK. 
CODE R. § 7  
 
CA 
 CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 33332 (West 
2009) 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41032 
(West 2009); CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 2, § 1800; tit. 5, § 
3000  
 
CO 
1 COLO. 
CODE REGS. 
§ 301-
11:2245-R-
3.00 (Lexis 
2017) 
COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 17-32-107, 
22-2-138, 22-11-
605, 22-37-107, 22-
80-103 (Lexis 2017) 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-
28-111.5, -32-142, -81.5-105 
(Lexis 2017) 
COLO. 
REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-
20.5-503 
(Lexis 
2017); 1 
COLO. 
CODE 
REGS. § 
301-
44:2202-R-
4.00 (Lexis 
2017) 
CT 
 CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-4u, -9, -
10d, -11, -76c, -299 
(West 2010) 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-
21c, -237, -266x (West 2010) 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
DE 
 DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 14, § 132 
(Michie 2015) 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 
1056, 4204 
14-100 
DEL. 
ADMIN. 
CODE § 
101;  
DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 
14, § 2302 
FL 
FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 
215.981 
(West 2016); 
§ 1011.765 
(West 2013) 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE 
ANN. r. 6A-16.026 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1001.43 
(West 2016), 1011.07 (West 
2016), 1101.19 (West 2013); 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
6A-1.0143 
 
 
GA 
 GA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 2, ¶ I; GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 20-
2-14, -2-67, -2-1070, 
-14-26.1 (Lexis 
2016); § 15-21-177 
(Lexis 2015) 
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5, ¶ 
VI; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-
64, -74, -171, -520, -1075 
(Lexis 2016) 
 
HI 
 HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 302A-803, 
302A-806, 302A-
1122, 302A-1148, 
302A-1503, 302L-5, 
321-52 (Lexis 
2013); HAW. CODE 
R. 8-45-1, -46-1, 46-
2, 46-3, -54-2.6 
  
ID 
 IDAHO CONST. 
ART. IX, § 4; 
IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 33-128, -902, -
3408, -3714, -5504B 
(Michie 2015); § 
67-824 (Michie 
2014) 
 IDAHO 
CODE ANN. 
§§ 33-5003, 
-5004 
(Michie 
2015) 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
IL 
 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 89, § 830.100 
(2017); ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, 
105/6z-46, 215/1 
(West 2002); tit. 
105, 5/2-3.127a, 5/2-
3.36, 305/4 (West 
2002) 
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/1B-8, 5/5-21, 5/16-1, 5/16-7, 
60/90 (West 2002) 
ILL. 
ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 
89, 830.20 
IN 
IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 20-
26-5-22.5, -
26-7-9, -47-1-
5 (Lexis 
2015) 
IND. CODE ANN. § 
20-19-3-5 (Lexis 
2015) 
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-35-4-7 
(Lexis 2015) 
IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 20-
21-3-11, -
22-3-11 
(Lexis 
2015) 
IA 
IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 
279.62 (West 
2011) 
IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 256.36;  
279.51, 565.3 (West 
2011) 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 279.42 
(West 2011); Iowa Admin. 
Code r. 281-98.92 
(257,279,298A,565), 281-
98.67(257,279,298A,565), 281-
98.66(257,279,298A,565) 
IOWA 
CODE ANN. 
§ 298A.15 
(West 
2011) 
KS 
KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 72-
8257 (Fuse 
2002) 
KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 72-7518, -7518a 
(Furse 2002) 
 
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-26-5 
(2017) 
 
KY 
 KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 157.220, 
157.922, 160.580, 
164.787 (West 
2006) 
 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
156.035, 158.867 (West 2006) 
KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 158.6485 
(West 
2006) 
 
LA 
LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 4:707 
(West 2011) 
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
17:17.2, :194, :1989.
5 (West 2013) 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 
17:7, :81, :95, :1757 (West 
2013) 
 
 
ME 
ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 20-
A, § 8202; 
tit. 30-A, § 
5652 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
30-A, § 6006-F; tit. 
20-A, §§ 6602, 7301 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, §§ 
1256, 1705, 6213 
ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 
20-A, § 
7407 
MD 
 MD. CODE ANN. 
EDUC. § 2-207 
(Lexis 2014) 
MD. CODE ANN. EDUC. § 4-
118 (Lexis 2014); MD. CODE 
REGS. 23.03.05.05 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
MA 
 MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 29, § 
2MMM (Lexis 
2016) 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
71, § 37A (Lexis 2013); ch. 60, 
§ 3C (Lexis 2010); ch. 40, §§ 
3, 4E (Lexis 2006); ch. 44, § 
53A (Lexis 2006); 603 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 50.07 
MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. 
ch. 76, § 
12A 
MI 
 MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN.  
§§ 388.1008, .1008a 
(Thomson 2014); 
§§ 12.262, 21.161 
(West 2004) 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
380.11a, .602, .402, .431a 
(West 2014); § 380.15 (West 
2013) 
 
MICH. 
COMP. 
LAWS ANN. 
§ 380.1311h 
(West 
2013) 
MN 
 MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 16A.013 
(Thomson 2013); 
§§ 127A.32, 
124D.118 
(Thomson 2016) 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 465.03, 
471.69 (Thomson West 2008) 
 
MS 
MISS. CODE. 
ANN. § 37-
11-73 (Lexis 
2013) 
 
MISS. CODE. ANN. 
§ 37-11-8 (Lexis 
2013) 
MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 37-7-
301, -419 (Lexis 2013) 
 
MISS. 
CODE. 
ANN. § 37-
139-11, -
140-11 
(Lexis 
2013) 
MO 
MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 
167.280 
(West 2010) 
MO. CONST. art. 
IX, § 5; MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 160.925, 
161.930, 162.785, 
162.790, 166.101 
(West 2010) 
 MO. CODE 
REGS. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 10-
42.030 
MT 
 MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 20-8-111, -9-601, 
-9-604, -9-905, 17-3-
1001 (2014); MONT. 
ADMIN. R. 
10.59.101 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-
208, -6-601, -9-604, -10-201 
(2014) 
 
NE 
 NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-162 
(Lexis 2017); §§ 72-
266, 79-1063, 79-
1104.02 (Lexis 
2014) 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-
1204 (Lexis 2014) 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
NV 
NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 388D.270, 
.280 (Lexis 
2016) 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 388.800, 
385.083, 391A.255 
(Lexis 2016) 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
354.598005 (Lexis 2017); §§ 
386.390, 387.090, 387.175, 
388.453, 389.064 (Lexis 2016)  
NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 388G.210 
NH 
 N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 195-J:3 
(Lexis 2011); N.H. 
CODE R. ED 905.04 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:19 
(Lexis 2013); 
N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§ 194-D:5 
(Lexis 
2011) 
NJ 
2016 NJ 
Regulation 
Text 21410 
(Sept. 18, 
2017) 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
18A: 4-26, :7G-22, 
:20-4, :51-7, :56-1 
(West 2010) 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:18A-
15.1 (West 2010);  
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6A:26-
3.12, .15 
 
NM 
N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-
5A-1 (2013) 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 22-2C-9, 22-2C-
10, 22-8-47, 22-8-
48, 22-9-4, 22-13-
28.1, 22-15E-6, 
32A-23-8, 32A-
23A-5 (2017) 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 
(2017) 
 
NY 
  N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1950, 
2590-m (Thomson 2007); 
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1689 
N.Y. EDUC. 
LAW § 3701 
(Thomson 
2015);  
§ 4318 
(Thomson 
2016) 
NC 
N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 115C-490, 
-491, -492 
(West 2010) 
H.B. 17D, 2016 
Gen. Assemb., 
Extra Sess. (N.C. 
2015); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 
115C-410, 116C-5 
(West 2010) 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
115C-47, -238.65 (West 2010)  
 
ND 
N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. 
§ 21-06-12 
(Lexis 2012) 
N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 1-08-02, 4-
37-04 (Lexis 2012) 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
08-04, 15.1-09-51, 15.1-35-04 
(Lexis 2015) 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
OH 
OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 
§ 
2921.43(A)  
(1) 
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
3302.067, 3313.36, 3313.17, 
3315.40 (West 2012); § 307.22 
(West 2005); OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE 3301-51-02 
OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 
§§ 3325.10, 
.15(West 
2012) 
OK 
OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 70, 
§ 5-145 
(Thomson 
2013) 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 70, §§ 622, 
1210.227, 1210.257, 
1210.555 (Thomson 
2005) 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-
129.5 (Thomson 2013); tit. 11, 
§ 22-125 (West 2012); tit. 60, § 
381 (West 2010); tit. 70, § 
1210.710 (Thomson 2005) 
 
OR 
 OR. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 2; OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 
327.008, 327.344, 
342.953, 346.270 
(2015) 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
328.105, 328.155, 334.215 
 (2015); OR. ADMIN. R. 581-
024-0310 
 
PA 
  24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2-216 
(Thomson 2016) 
 
RI 
 R.I. CONST. art. 
XII, § 3 
16 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 
16-3-11, -19-1.1, -89-5 (Lexis 
2013); §§ 16-89-2, -4 (Lexis 
2010); tit. 45, § 45-38-3 (Lexis 
2010) 
 
SC 
 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 
59-29-440, -69-40,  
-152-50, -152-130 
(Thomson 2004) 
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-160, 
-33-60, -65-280 (Thomson 
2004) 
 
SD 
S.D. 
CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 13-
14-13 to -14 
(Thomson 
2004) 
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  
§ 13-14-5 (Thomson 2004) 
S.D. 
CODIFIED 
LAWS  
§ 13-16-1 
(Thomson 
2004) 
TN 
TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 49-
2-602, -603,  
-604, -612 
(Lexis 2017) 
TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 49-6-1405, -2006, 
-2405 (Lexis 2017) 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-16-
103 (Lexis 2017) 
TENN. 
CODE ANN. 
§ 49-2-607 
(Lexis 
2017) 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
TX 
 TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 21.453, 
37.214, 45.163 
(West 2012) 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 
11.156, 29.915, 38.213, 45.516 
(West 2012); 19 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 61.1081 
TEX. EDUC. 
CODE ANN. 
§§ 26.67-
App., 
30.025, 
30.056 
(West 
2012) 
UT 
UTAH 
ADMIN. 
CODE r. 628-
2-9 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 53A-1-406, 63N-
12-205 (Lexis 2016) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-4-
205 (Lexis 2016); § 11-2-8 
(Lexis 2015); UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE r. 277-407-5  
 
VT 
   VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 
16, § 3641 
(Lexis 
2016) 
VA 
VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 
22.1-212.2:2, 
-289.01 
(Lexis 2016) 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
22.1-98.1, -175.2,  
-175.7, -199.4,  
-299.2, 318.1 (Lexis 
2016); 8 VA. 
ADMIN. CODE § 20-
81-100 (Lexis 
2016); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 9.1-110 
(Lexis 2012) 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-126,  
-353 (Lexis 2016) 
 
WA 
 WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 
28A.300.465, 
.515.300 (West 
2014); § 43.215.450 
(West 2012); § 
72.40.300 (West 
2004) 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
28A.193.040, .320.030 (West 
2011) 
 
 
WV 
W. VA. 
CODE R. § 
126-2-3 
W. VA. CONST. art. 
XII, § 4; W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18-2-
16 (Lexis 2016);  
§ 5B-2C-4 (Lexis 
2015) 
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-5-
13, -5D-4, -9D-3 (Lexis 2016) 
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State 
Regulatory or Statutory Mention of Donations: 
ESOs State Level  Local Level School 
Level  
WI 
WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 
118.27 
(Thomson 
2016) 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
115.29 (Thomson 
2016); WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE PI § 20.02  
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.27 
(Thomson 2016) 
 
WY 
 WYO. CONST. art. 
VII, § 3; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
2-603; -22-101 
(Lexis 2017) 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-20-108 
(Lexis 2017); 206-2-8 WYO. 
CODE R. § 4 (Lexis 2017)  
 
 
 
